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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (Its Development from Autumn 1959 to Summer 1960)

(Reference Title: ESAU XI-61)

Office of Current Intelligence

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(Its Development from Autumn 1959 to Summer 1960)

This is a working paper, the third in a series of studies of the dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties about the strategy and tactics of the world Communist movement. This paper, beginning with the confrontation of Mao and Khrushchev in Peiping in autumn 1959 and ending with the impasse that followed the Paris "summit" meeting, includes the period of one of the most important developments in world Communism in recent years--the systematic and scornful Chinese attacks on Soviet positions in the spring of 1960.

The period encompassed by this paper was one primarily of Chinese initiatives and Soviet responses. Two more papers in this series will treat the period of the Bucharest conference of Communist parties in June 1960 through the Moscow conference of Communist parties in November 1960, a period primarily of a Soviet counter-offensive.

We are grateful to analysts of the [redacted] for comments on the draft of this paper. We would welcome further comment, addressed to [redacted] who wrote this paper, or to [redacted] the acting coordinator of the [redacted] at [redacted]

SUMMARY

Khrushchev apparently came to Peiping in October 1959 in the mistaken belief that China's dependence on the USSR would force the Chinese party to accommodate to his global strategy--a strategy criticized by the Chinese for almost two years. In Peiping, he publicly rejected the Chinese contention that the Bloc should pursue a more militant and revolutionary strategy all over the world under the protection of Soviet military power; and Suslov endorsed Khrushchev's positions, perhaps thus disabusing Mao of a belief that the Chinese had support among Soviet leaders. The Chinese intensified their attacks on Khrushchev's positions after his departure.

In several speeches in the USSR subsequently, Khrushchev reaffirmed his belief in the overriding importance of avoiding a general war, and his feeling that Western leaders were coming to the same view. He stated his favor for a long-term accommodation with the West--not in terms of abandoning political, economic, and ideological pressure on the West but in terms of avoiding war and/or serious risks of war. Inter alia, he criticized Mao's thinking as Trotskyist and as playing into the hands of the enemy; to Peiping's dismay, he took a conciliatory line on DeGaulle's proposals for ending the Algerian war; he failed to endorse Chinese positions on several Far Eastern issues; he derided Chinese domestic policies; he accused the CCP of conceit; and he warned that opposition to fundamental Soviet policies would not be tolerated.

By the end of 1959, Soviet public lecturers were openly referring to difficulties in the Sino-Soviet relationship, probably in order to prepare the Soviet populace for the possibility of a radical deterioration in relations. Khrushchev himself suggested at the time that the relationship had deteriorated to a dangerous point.

President Eisenhower's State of the Union message on 7 January 1960 was given differing emphases by Moscow and Peiping--the former picking out of the message some of the more hopeful signs (in the Soviet view) that the United States was prepared to ease international tensions, and the latter citing it as an example of the deceitful American practice of talking peace while preparing for war. In the Chinese view, the apparent American interest in detente was nothing more than a maneuver to buy the necessary time to overcome Soviet military superiority.

That Mao was proselytizing in the Communist world against Khrushchev and Khrushchev's strategy was evidenced in January 1960 during the visit to China of an East German government delegation. Mao told the East Germans that he disagreed with Soviet policy on disarmament and Berlin and that China would not sign any disarmament agreement unless it was given its legitimate seat in the United Nations and unless the United States withdrew from Taiwan.

Throughout the early part of 1960, there were growing indications of Chinese annoyance with Soviet disarmament policy. The Chinese probably believed that any Soviet-American disarmament agreement would tend to freeze Communist China out of the nuclear club, would undermine the Soviet capability to fight local wars, would throw away the Soviet military advantage, and might even be the beginning of an East-West accommodation achieved at China's expense.

At the Warsaw Pact conference in February 1960, it is likely that joint Chinese-East German pressure was brought to bear on the Russians for the sharing of nuclear weapons but that this pressure was resisted. On the question of strategy, there was a complete impasse. Moreover, Khrushchev reportedly criticized Chinese actions against India and Indonesia in strong terms and complained that Peiping had refused to support the USSR's attempts to reduce world tension, had not followed the USSR's lead by demobilizing any part of its armed forces, was too insistent on following its own independent policies, and was harming the cause of Communism.

In February, the Chinese in their journals said in effect that the cold war could not be meaningfully abated; that the danger of war would continue to exist and the bloc must prepare for all contingencies; that disarmament negotiations were more or less useless; that the bloc should concentrate not on negotiations with the West but on building its own resources and securing its own strength.

In April 1960 the Chinese offered a comprehensive indictment of Soviet theory, strategy and tactics in the form of five lengthy and acrimonious doctrinal statements which in effect accused Khrushchev--in his 20th Congress formulations--of having revised, emasculated and betrayed Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese rejected Khrushchev's views on the possibility and advisability of seeking a long-range detente with the West and contended that coexistence could mean only an armed truce; they argued that wars, particularly local and colonial wars, were inevitable so long as imperialism remained; and they minimized the possibility of peaceful

accession to power in the non-Communist world. In attacking Khrushchev's ideological innovations and the strategy which these innovations reflected, the Chinese were not calling for general war, although they may have believed this inevitable. Rather, they were attacking Khrushchev's gradualist revolutionary conception and putting forth an alternative conception--based on the conviction that the West could be defeated sooner than Khrushchev thought if the USSR and the world Communist movement were more aggressive.

In broader terms, the massive Chinese attack on Khrushchev's positions involved a decision to bring before the entire Communist world the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the bloc, a challenge sustained by one of the most serious charges one Communist party can make against another--the charge of abandonment of revolutionary positions.

The question of strategy toward the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America--the "colonial and semi-colonial" areas--had all along been highly important in the Sino-Soviet dispute. During the spring of 1960 there were several developments relating to the question of Soviet aid to these areas, the question of support of "liberation" movements, the specific case of the Algerian rebellion, and the growing Chinese interest in African affairs.

For a variety of reasons, the Chinese seemed to oppose the Soviet aid program to non-Communist countries--to oppose, at least, the scale of such aid and the priority it enjoyed in Soviet thinking. The Chinese had already indicated their belief that such aid would strengthen non-Communist governments to the detriment of the revolution. They may have believed further that such aid could otherwise be used to support their own economic development and that Soviet aid programs might facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence at the expense of Chinese influence.

The Chinese took a much stronger line than did the Russians on the need for supporting "liberation" movements which in turn would pursue aggressive policies. The Chinese contended that the Communist party in each country that had not attained independence should seek at the earliest opportunity to take over the independence movement rather than to leave leadership of such movements in the hands of genuine nationalist parties; that the Communist party in each country which had attained formal independence must put enough pressure on the nationalist government to get Communists taken into the government or at least to achieve a pro-Communist government; and that a policy of

prolonged cooperation with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries--the policy advocated by Moscow--would almost certainly lead to disaster. Perhaps most importantly for the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese argued that the Bloc should abandon its cautious policy toward "liberation" movements and give them all-out support, even if this entailed a risk of local wars with the West.

Differences between Moscow and Peiping over the "colonial liberation" struggle, and the specific issue of support of "liberation" movements, have been illustrated in their respective attitudes toward the Algerian rebellion. In the period discussed in this paper, the Chinese evidently calculated that a continuation of the Algerian war would advance both the interests of the bloc and their own interests far more than would a negotiated settlement, and they seemed to view Khrushchev's support--however cautious--for DeGaulle's proposals to end the war as a betrayal of the "colonial liberation" struggle.

In the spring of 1960 the Chinese considerably increased their attention to African affairs. The principal Chinese effort was made at the second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference, held in Guinea in April. The Chinese made a strong bid to dominate the proceedings and the organization itself. The Soviet and Chinese representatives reportedly clashed on the question of strategy.

It is unlikely that China was instrumental in the Soviet decision to wreck the summit conference in May 1960. Although the Chinese had long argued that negotiations must not take priority over revolutionary struggle, their public pronouncements on the eve of the summit indicated resignation rather than opposition. Of greater importance, however, the failure of the summit evidently emboldened Mao to press to a new and critical stage his initiative within the world Communist movement against Khrushchev's strategy and tactics.

No sooner had the summit collapsed than Soviet statements, including some from Khrushchev himself, indicated that, although the long term struggle with the West would not be abandoned on a political, economic and ideological level, the USSR would still not take serious risks of general war and would continue to be interested in negotiations with the West--even if it had to wait for years. This reaffirmation of "peaceful coexistence" clashed head-on with intensified Chinese urging for a radical change in Soviet policy.

I. KHRUSHCHEV IN PEIPING AND AFTER

Khrushchev in Peiping, October 1959

At the Washington Press Club on 16 September 1959, an American newsman asked Khrushchev what would be the purpose of his visit to Peiping after his tour of the United States. "That," replied Khrushchev before giving an innocuous reply, "is apparently the most 'difficult' question."

As we have seen (see ESAU X), Khrushchev was greeted on arrival in Peiping by a barrage of articles by CCP leaders which vigorously defended Chinese foreign and domestic policies against Soviet criticism, accused "some people" of "ignorance of Marxism-Leninism," implicitly attacked Soviet policy toward the uncommitted countries, and implicitly warned Khrushchev that the same Russian errors which led to severe losses for the Chinese Communist movement in the 1920's were now being repeated in the colonial areas. In addition to all this, Chinese objections to Khrushchev's negotiation tactics had been spelled out in the CCP's leading party journal on the very day that Khrushchev had arrived in the United States.

To add to Mao's discomfiture, there was the fact that Khrushchev was coming to Peiping after his talks with President Eisenhower. Mao may have reflected that the President had seen fit to journey to Western Europe to consult with his allies prior to his talks with the Soviet premier. Moreover, in response to a specific question on 5 August as to whether Khrushchev intended to consult with his allies prior to his US visit, Khrushchev had cavalierly dismissed the question:

> We will probably exchange views with our friends in one way or another, but I do not think that we need all gather for any discussions. The question of ensuring world peace is so clear that it is not a controversial one for the socialist countries. That is why we are sure that all the socialist countries will approve our activity in that direction....
> (emphasis supplied)

Khrushchev obviously was aware that the question of "ensuring world peace" was not "so clear" to his Chinese allies. That he was ready to wave them off in this manner may have reflected a belief that his Chinese comrades were still vitally dependent on the USSR and would have no alternative but to go along with Soviet policies. If this was his belief, he was mistaken.

In his two public speeches in Peiping, Khrushchev made little effort to meet the objections to Soviet strategy that the Chinese had been voicing for almost two years. In his arrival speech on 30 September he said that "everything must be done to clear the atmosphere and create conditions for friendship among peoples." In his banquet speech the same evening he reasserted his belief that the bloc would defeat the West in peaceful economic competition. He said that President Eisenhower and other Western leaders had begun to show a more realistic understanding of the world situation and that Eisenhower in particular "understands the need to relax international tension." Therefore, he continued, "we on our part must do all we can to exclude war as a means of settling disputed questions." There was "no other way" than that of peaceful coexistence.

Then, aiming straight at the heart of the Chinese concept that the bloc could pursue more militant policies all over the world under the shield of the Soviet nuclear deterrent, Khrushchev said:

> ...we must think realistically and understand the contemporary situation correctly. This, of course, does not by any means signify that if we are so strong, then we must test by force the stability of the capitalist system. This would be wrong; the peoples would not understand and would never support those who would think of acting in this way.

A few sentences later, he may have been aiming at the Chinese exhortations for a more revolutionary line in the uncommitted countries:

> The socialist countries...fire the hearts of men by the force of their example in building socialism and thus lead them to follow in their footsteps. The question of when this or that country will take the path of socialism is decided by its own people. This, for us, in the holy of holies. (emphasis supplied)

If Mao had had any hopes of relying on a so-called "China lobby" in the Kremlin allegedly led by Suslov, Suslov's speech in Peiping two days earlier cannot have given him much encouragement. Suslov was somewhat less enthusiastic than Khrushchev about the possibilities for relaxing tension but he nonetheless supported the broad outline of Khrushchev's global strategy. While he spoke of forces in the West interested in keeping up the cold war and of the

"projected relaxation" of tension, he insisted that "wars must be prevented because in our age--the age of the atom and of rocket technology--they threaten mankind with countless sufferings and disasters" (emphasis supplied). This line of reasoning--that the development of military technology threatened civilization and by implication required an adjustment of Soviet strategy--was vigorously rejected by Mao.

Suslov also made it clear that he supported Khrushchev's long-range policy of seducing the uncommitted countries by trade, aid and example rather than by the more revolutionary method the Chinese believed necessary for many or most of these countries. He said:

> The socialist states resolutely support the strivings of the countries of Asia and Africa to develop their national economies. We are extending help, and, as our possibilities grow, will extend still more help, to all countries of Asia and Africa. (emphasis supplied)

Finally, Suslov defended Khrushchev's trip to the US as having been accomplished "with honor, dignity and brilliance... and with Leninist adherence to principle." In effect, he was reminding Mao that he would not support the insinuations in the Chinese press that Khrushchev had watered down Leninist principles in making his trip to the United States.

The very fact that Khrushchev allowed Suslov to head the Soviet delegation to Peiping prior to his own arrival and at a time when Sino-Soviet relations were so strained suggests his confidence that Mao would not be able to exploit whatever differences in the Soviet leadership there may have been over foreign policy. The sending of Suslov may even have been intended as a deliberate demonstration to Mao that the Soviet leadership was united on Khrushchev's foreign policy.

Whatever arguments Khrushchev and Suslov used to defend Soviet strategy, the Chinese were cool to them. There was a failure to issue the customary pious joint communique and Khrushchev, in his departure speech, made the remarkable statement that "we Communists of the Soviet Union consider it our sacred duty, our primary task...to utilize all possibilities in order to liquidate the cold war." This suggested that Khrushchev could no longer speak for China on this question.

That the confrontation between Mao and Khrushchev during the Chinese anniversary celebrations had proceeded far from smoothly is further suggested by [redacted] developments that took place at the time. There is, for example, [redacted] Mao personally told at least one visiting delegation that the CPSU had handled the denigration of Stalin in a very abrupt manner, that Molotov was a valiant party member with a world of experience, and that "peaceful disentanglement"--possibly a reference to prolonged coexistence--was a theory with no historical precedent. In short, Mao, in talks with foreign Communist parties who were in Peiping to celebrate the anniversary was evidently lobbying against Khrushchev's tactics. That Mao would have gone to the extreme of praising Molotov to foreign parties must have been regarded by Khrushchev as unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the CPSU, along with Mao's violation of "proletarian internationalism" in challenging Khrushchev's tactics.

The official Polish Communist delegation to the anniversary celebrations came away convinced, according to a report from the New York Times correspondent A.M. Rosenthal (New York Times, 24 November 1959) that there were important "differences of approach and policy" between Moscow and Peiping. The Polish Communists gathered from talks in Peiping with both the Russians and the Chinese that Chinese resentment at being left out of the summit talks had increased and had been made quite clear to Khrushchev. According to the Poles, the Chinese also were annoyed with Khrushchev for not giving sufficient support to Peiping's campaign to take over Taiwan. (As ESAU-X has argued) The Polish sources also reported that Chinese Communist resentment at being left out of high-level negotiations was one of the motivations behind Peiping's decision to stir up trouble with India over the boundary question. The incident was said to be intended as a reminder to India, the Soviet Union, and the West that there were important areas of the world where settlements could be reached only by direct negotiation with Peiping. Two subsidiary motives for the attack on India were alleged to be Nehru's ouster of the Communist government in Kerala and the belief that the Indians had given too much aid and comfort to Tibetan refugees.

Khrushchev's Formal Report to the Supreme Soviet, 31 October

Khrushchev's speeches in the USSR after returning from Peiping reaffirmed his belief in the struggle for peace as "the main task of today" and directed oblique remarks to the Chinese Communists for advocating tougher policies toward the West. In these speeches, Khrushchev also reaffirmed his apparently genuine fear of a nuclear holocaust. Thus, in

Vladivostok on 6 October, he cautioned that the US and the USSR could not confront each other like "two cocks ready to lay hold and peck each other." He recalled that in his meeting with President Eisenhower, the President had expressed his fear of war and Khrushchev had replied that "only an unreasonable person can be fearless of war in our days." While it was necessary to fight if war was "imposed upon a people" it was "unreasonable to be eager for war..." Khrushchev also reaffirmed his confidence in the President as a man of peace and "farsightedness."

In a speech in Novosibirsk on 10 October, Khrushchev defined his understanding of peaceful coexistence in a way which indicated that Mao had expressed concern to him that the "coexistence" line would retard the revolutionary struggle.

> Peaceful coexistence must be understood correctly. Coexistence means the continuation of the struggle between the two social systems, but of a struggle by peaceful means, without war, without the interference of a state into the domestic affairs of another state. One should not be afraid. We must struggle resolutely and consistently for our ideas, for our way of life, for our socialist system. The partisans of capitalism too will not, of course, abandon their way of life, their ideology; they will fight. We hold that this struggle must be economic, political and ideological, but not military. (emphasis supplied)

Khrushchev's formal report to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October was his first effort to describe the main direction of Soviet policy since his talks with President Eisenhower. This speech was the high point of Khrushchev's climb toward a "detente."

Khrushchev began by contending that "a more sensible understanding of the relation of forces on the international arena is now beginning to prevail in the West." The West was making a "more sober evaluation of the situation." This new Western evaluation was "bound to lead to the conclusion" that the West could not use its military forces against the socialist world. The factors favoring peace were the increasing strength of the Bloc, the rise of the newly independent countries, the peace-loving forces in the capitalist countries themselves, and the "many statesmen" in the West who "begin to understand" that war threatens destruction.

Peaceful coexistence, continued Khrushchev, was not something to be desired or not desired. It was an "objective necessity" proceeding from the "present situation in the world," namely that both sides "possess weapons which would cause perilous consequences if they were put into action." Moreover, said Khrushchev, coexistence was the existing state of affairs: the question was how to coexist "on a reasonable basis."

Reasonable coexistence, he continued, presupposed "mutual concessions in the interests of peace," a position based on principle but which at the same time was "flexible." Lenin had taught, he went on, that the working class,

> before as well as after it has gained power, must be able to pursue a flexible policy, compromise and come to agreement whenever life and the interests of the cause demand it.

"Mutual concessions," a term which he repeated several times, did not mean that there would be any ideological concessions or compromise on "principles." However, he continued, looking over his shoulder toward Peiping, "we have no reason to fear that the peoples of the socialist countries will be seduced by the capitalist devil and give up socialism. To think differently means not to believe wholly in the strength of socialism..."

A paragraph later, Khrushchev was again pointing directly at Peiping when he recalled Lenin's "flexible foreign policy" during the period of the Brest peace in 1920:

> It was during the period of the Brest peace that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin set the task of concluding peace with Germany in order to insure for the young Soviet state the possibility for peaceful construction of socialism. Lenin and the party then had to conduct a persistent struggle against Trotsky, who came out then with his Pilate's objections and put forward his notorious slogan of 'neither peace nor war' by which he played into the hands of the German imperialists. It is known that Trotsky's adventurist policy was used by German imperialism against the Soviet country...Such were the fruits of adventurism in policy. (emphasis supplied)

The very invocation of Trotsky, the arch heretic, is indicative of the seriousness of the charge Khrushchev was here making against Mao Tse-tung. Trotsky is virtually an "unperson" in Soviet media. Despite the fact that some of

the policies advocated by some of the "anti-group" in 1957 could have been identified by Khrushchev with Trotskyism, he did not go this far even with his own internal party opponents.

Second, Khrushchev was in effect contending that just as Trotsky "played into the hands" of the German imperialists, Mao was now playing into the hands of the Western imperialists. For the West could employ the Mao's "adventurist" line against the USSR. In Stalin's Russia, people were not infrequently shot for "objectively" playing into the hands of the enemy.*

After thus severely condemning Mao's policy, Khrushchev went on to deny that the USSR was insincere when it spoke of peaceful coexistence or that it was advancing the slogan simply for tactical reasons. This was a distortion, he contended; Marxism "has never considered that war among states is necessary for the victory of the working class."

Khrushchev then listed the various indications that a thaw was occurring in international relations. These included the nuclear test talks, the foreign ministers' conference, the various exchanges of visits--all of which were of "positive significance." He described his visit with President Eisenhower as a "particularly important and far-reaching step in the direction of radically improving relations between the USSR and the US and generally relaxing international tension." Many outstanding American personalities, he said, "with the President at their head," understood the longing of the American people for peace and wanted to find ways to consolidate peace. Moreover, his visit had contributed to a better understanding in the United States of the Soviet desire for peace.

Khrushchev then reversed the Soviet attitude on DeGaulle's 16 September proposals for ending the Algerian war. Although these proposals had previously been denounced in the Soviet press as a fraud, Khrushchev now said that DeGaulle's proposals "may play an important role in settlement of the Algerian question." It would play this role particularly if it was supported by "realistic steps." He called for "mutual coordination of the mutual interests of the parties"

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* The CCP retorted in December by reiterating their praise of Stalin as having been--unlike some--"an uncompromising enemy of imperialism."

and recalled that "historically developed close bonds exist between Algeria and France." Khrushchev thus left the clear impression that he might support a French-FLN settlement which would leave Algeria associated with the French community. He also left the clear impression that he favored serious negotiations to bring the long bloody war to an end. Within a few days of this statement, the French Communist party reversed its previous hostility to DeGaulle's proposal with a long mea culpa.

The impact of this statement on Peiping--read in the context of Khrushchev's calls for "mutual concessions"--can hardly be exaggerated. For a year, Peiping had been insisting that the Algerian rebels were providing a splendid example to national revolutionary movements throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. Only a month before, Chinese spokesmen had publicly called for a more revolutionary line in the uncommitted countries. For Khrushchev to swing closer to the French line on Algeria at such a time--for whatever reasons--must have been viewed in Peiping as tantamount to betrayal of the revolution (see pages 58-65.)

In speaking of Taiwan, Khrushchev gave only a mild endorsement of China's rights to the island: "the legal and moral right is on its side." Turning to Korea and Laos--both areas in which Peiping had for some time been threatening the use of force--Khrushchev cautioned against the use of force. His "impression" was, he said, that the "United States is not seeking a military conflict there (in South Korea)," contrary to Peiping's line then and now that the U.S. was building up for aggression. With regard to Laos, Khrushchev said the USSR was "against the existence of even the smallest source of war in Laos which could give food to the aggressive forces." Given a "sensible approach" there, he said, the "skirmishes taking place could be soon eliminated" and the situation could be "normalized."

With regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute, Khrushchev maintained his neutral attitude: he was grieved that casualties occurred on "both sides," he thought the issues could be resolved to the "satisfaction of both sides."

In urging a solution to disarmament, Khrushchev painted a gloomy picture of the consequences of war--consequences not only for the capitalists but for all. A new war, he said,--coming close to Malenkov's heresy of 1954 that civilization would be destroyed--would cause mankind "unprecedented sacrifice, devastation and suffering."

Khrushchev concluded this remarkably conciliatory speech with a plea for lasting peace.

> The Soviet Government deems it its duty to our people and to all of mankind to consolidate the achieved relaxation of tension in international relations, and to adhere firmly to a course leading from relaxation to a complete liquidation of international tension, and to turn the achieved relaxation into a lasting peace.

In the above speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev put himself on record before the Russian people as favoring a long-range accommodation with the West and as prepared to make as well as to receive concessions in order to achieve the accommodation. He attributed sincerity to Western leaders, particularly to President Eisenhower, in wanting peace. In effect, he told his audience that having seen for himself the state of opinion in the United States, he was convinced that a long-term stabilization was possible. This is not to say that Khrushchev had overnight abandoned the "world revolution." He did seem to believe, however, that this revolution would be a long-term affair which could not be promoted aggressively in the nuclear era.

For Mao, this speech must have been an abomination. The April 1960 Red Flag and People's Daily articles, indicting the whole theoretical structure of Soviet foreign policy, were in large part directed at this speech. The speech probably marked a new downward turn in the increasingly troubled Sino-Soviet relationships. The lines between Khrushchev and Mao were now drawn in classical fashion. Khrushchev was calling Mao an adventurist and Trotskyite who was pushing ahead much too fast both in his domestic programs and in his plans for world revolution. Mao was in effect calling Khrushchev an appeaser and was soon to call him a revisionist for abandoning the traditional Leninist views on imperialism, war, and peace.

Khrushchev's 30 October speech, as indicated earlier, was a statement of the upper limits of Khrushchev's detente policy. The strategy underlying this policy can be gleaned from a confidential "Peace Plan" formulated by Khrushchev and disseminated to Communist parties throughout the world in early October. In this plan, Khrushchev contended that a more or less lengthy period of peace was necessary in order to buy time for the bloc to outstrip the West in economic production and for the revolutionary forces throughout the world to prepare themselves "morally and materially."

The prospects began by asserting that the CPSU expected firm support for peace from all the fraternal parties. The CPSU, it continued, had long-range plans for the building of socialism throughout the world. Although there had been a slight improvement in the world situation, the utmost effort was still required so that peace might be prolonged as long as possible.

During this peaceful phase, the socialist camp would be in an increasingly good position to give moral as well as material support to the socialist (i.e., Communist) forces of non-Communist countries for the building up of the revolutionary movements. In conditions of peace, the "genuine" socialist forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America could build up their revolutionary movements morally and materially.

Thus, Khrushchev's two directives to the world Communist movement in October 1959 were: first, be careful to avoid all actions that might lead to war; and, second, continue to build up the party against the day when revolutionary action might be feasible.

In another speech--to the Hungarian party congress--on 1 December, Khrushchev advanced a long step forward in his ideological indictment of Mao's domestic and foreign policies. This time Khrushchev added a warning that such deviation would not be tolerated--a warning which seemed to have little effect on Mao.

Khrushchev began be reviewing the lessons taught by the "mistakes" of the Stalinist Rakosi leadership in Hungary--lessons which, he declared, "other Communist and workers parties cannot but heed." He warned against "armchair leaders" who "order the masses about"; he warned against "disregarding objective conditions" and ruling "by decree" instead of by persuasion; he avowed that although no Communist leaders were guaranteed against mistakes in socialist construction, "one must have the courage openly to admit one's mistakes and to correct them in time." In all this, he seemed to be aiming at Mao's headlong economic policies.

Turning then to a defense of the 20th Congress and the reevaluation of Stalin, he did not agree with "some people" who contended that the de-Stalinization question should "not have been raised so sharply." The Chinese had already indicated their dislike of Khrushchev's handling of this question at the 20th Congress.

Then, in a series of passages that were unmistakably directed at Mao, Khrushchev warned against foolishness and conceit and stressed the need for discipline in the Communist movement.

> Even now the enemies of socialism do not abandon their plans of smashing the socialist camp and are, of course, looking for the weak links in it. They want to rout the socialist countries one by one. We must bear this danger in mind, because it is real, and we must do everything to deprive our enemies of these hopes. In these sinister plans the only ally of imperialist aspirations and hopes can be our foolishness.
>
> If we become conceited, if we commit mistakes in our leadership, if we distort the teaching of Marxism-Leninism on the building of socialism and Communism, these mistakes can be exploited by the enemies of Communism as was done in 1956.
>
> ...our enemies will attempt to set one socialist country against another in order to weaken the forces of socialism. We must bear in mind that the striving to make the socialist countries quarrel among themselves, to undermine the relations of friendship and brotherhood between them, is one of the forms of class struggle employed by our enemy. This is why the immutable principles of proletarian internationalism are the supreme, irrevocable law of the international Communist movement...
>
> We must make sensible use of the great advantages of the socialist system and strengthen the world socialist camp in every way... We must be masters of Leninism. We must not fall behind or go too far ahead. We must, figuratively speaking, synchronize our watches. If the leadership of this or that country becomes conceited, this can only play into the hands of the enemy. In this case, the socialist countries themselves, the leadership itself, will help the enemy to fight socialism, to fight Communism, and this cannot be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

In these passages, Khrushchev was conceding that Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated to the point that they were in serious danger of being "undermined." Mao's domestic policies, he implied, might lead to insurrection as did Rakosi's in Hungary. Mao's foreign policy, he warned again, was playing into the hands of the imperialist enemy. Finally, he warned Mao that he must obey the "supreme irrevocable" law

of proletarian internationalism--that is, submission to Soviet policy--and that independent courses would not be tolerated.

A few passages later, Khrushchev was back again refuting Mao's position on peace and war. "No Communist party anywhere, if it really is Communist," he said, "has ever said that it hopes to achieve its aims through war. Nor indeed, could it say so." Although this was a distortion of the Chinese position, it was a rebuke to Mao's view that armed struggle should be encouraged and supported in many areas of the world.

Returning to the theme of his Supreme Soviet speech, Khrushchev contended that the fight for a "stable and durable peace" was one of the principal tasks of the Communist movement. The importance of this struggle, he said, was "hard to overestimate."

Public Criticism of Peiping in USSR

By December 1959, the Sino-Soviet relationship had deteriorated to such a point that Soviet spokesmen began to criticize their Chinese allies in public. On 2 December, a [redacted] Soviet speaker at a public lecture at Moscow University had referred to difficulties in the Sino-Soviet relationship. He specifically mentioned the Sino-Indian border dispute and the "cold and incorrect reception" given Khrushchev on his visit to Peiping in October. On 11 December, another Soviet public speaker in Moscow criticized the Chinese commune program as a "mess," and asserted that the Chinese Communists' cultural timetable was off by 20 to 30 years, in view of the country's backwardness and poverty. On 18 December, a Soviet diplomat in Geneva, talking to newsmen as a Soviet official who could be so quoted but not identified by name, reportedly lamented Communist China's activity in connection with the Sino-Indian border dispute as "more than untimely" and as a development that would be "inopportune at any time."

On 21 December, the eightieth anniversary of Stalin's birthday, Pravda and People's Daily presented diverging interpretations of Stalin which highlighted the strategic and doctrinal differences between the two parties. Pravda gave a balanced presentation of Stalin's achievements and failures and avoided his views on war and foreign policy; People's Daily, on the other hand, attended almost exclusively to Stalin's virtues and, in what was clearly a criticism of Khrushchev's detente line, reminded its readers that Stalin had urged the need for a "high degree of vigilance against

imperialism." The Chinese editorial quoted a 1951 statement by Stalin in which he warned that "should the warmongers resort to lies to trap and deceive the people in order to drag them into another war, such a war would become inevitable"--a statement ignored in recent years by Soviet media and in striking contrast to Khrushchev's current emphasis on the possibility of excluding war from human life forever. The editorial also praised highly the Moscow declaration of the Communist parties in November 1957--anticipating an exchange of charges between the Soviet and Chinese parties that the other had departed from the declaration.

In sum, Khrushchev apparently came to Peiping in the mistaken belief that China's dependence on the USSR would force the Chinese party to accommodate to his global strategy. In Peiping, he publicly rejected the Chinese contention that the Bloc should pursue more militant and revolutionary strategy all over the world under the protection of Soviet military power; and Suslov endorsed Khrushchev's positions, perhaps thus disabusing Mao of a belief that Mao had supporters among Soviet leaders. The Chinese intensified their attacks on Khrushchev's positions after his departure.

In several speeches in the USSR subsequently, Khrushchev reaffirmed his belief in the overriding importance of avoiding a general war, and his feeling that Western leaders were coming to the same view. He stated his favor for a long-term accommodation with the West (i.e., an avoidance of war or provocation that might lead to war) based on mutual concessions. Inter alia, he criticized Mao's thinking as Trotskyist, and as playing into the hands of the enemy; to Peiping's dismay, he took a conciliatory line on DeGaulle's proposals for ending the Algerian war; he failed to endorse Chinese positions on several Far Eastern issues; he derided Chinese domestic policies; he accused the CCP of conceit; and he warned that opposition to fundamental Soviet policies would not be tolerated. By the end of 1959, Soviet public lecturers were openly referring to difficulties in the Sino-Soviet relationship and, as Khrushchev himself suggested at the time, the relationship had deteriorated to a dangerous point.

II. THE WORSENING OF THE DISPUTE

In the first two months of 1960 there was abundant evidence that the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy was not only not being resolved but was becoming more bitter. This was apparent in divergent reactions to President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, in the Red Flag editorial on New Year's Day, in the Chinese response to Khrushchev's important 14 January speech, in Sino-Soviet clashes in Communist front organizations in January and February, and in a sharp division between them at the Warsaw pact conference in February.

The President's State of the Union Message

The sharp contrast between Soviet and Chinese views on the possibility and desirability of achieving a detente with the United States was well illustrated in the divergent reactions to President Eisenhower's 7 January State of the Union message. Moscow, in its limited comment, did not criticize the President personally, picked out of the message some of the more hopeful signs (in the Soviet view) that the United States was prepared to ease international tensions, and was in general quite restrained in whatever criticism it offered. The Chinese, on the other hand, were unreservedly critical both of the President personally and what they characterized as a deceitful effort to talk peace while preparing for war.

The TASS summary of Eisenhower's message began by stating that

> the President emphasized in the message that in his final year at the White House he is determined to throw every ounce of his energy into insuring world peace...

TASS further quoted the President as being "always ready to participate with the Soviet Union in serious discussion of these subjects (nuclear testing) or any other subjects that may lead to peace with justice." It went on to qualify this, however, by pointing to the President's stress also on the need to maintain "a high degree" of military effectiveness. In a routine commentary on 9 January, Moscow radio's North American service outlined some of the proposals in the President's speech and commented that "we in the USSR can fully agree with the general trend of the President's suggestions." On the same day, Moscow's European service called attention to the fact that many sections of the American press had interpreted Eisenhower's speech as further evidence of his desire for a further relaxation of international tension.

The Chinese views on the President's message were set forth in more authoritative media and in much more bellicose terms. The People's Daily editorial of 21 January began its frontal assault by contending that the message was "most convincing evidence of the imperialist nature of the United States." In going through the text of the message, it continued, it was not possible to detect "even a trace" of any concrete steps the United States would take towards relaxing tension; nor did Eisenhower make "any proposal" favorable to peace.

From the State of the Union Message, said People's Daily, "only one conclusion could be drawn"--there was no change whatever in the "fundamental policy of arms expansion and war preparations which the United States has long pursued." The Chinese editorial pointed out that the United States 1) was speeding up its programs for the development of intercontinental missiles; 2) was speeding up the construction of two IRBM bases in Italy; 3) was continuing to prepare for war in the Far East; e.g. its recently concluded military alliance with Japan, its continued arming of Chinese nationalist forces, its repeated boasts that it would defend the offshore islands, and its expansion of missile bases in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; 4) was threatening to resume nuclear tests at any time; 5) had mapped out in the NATO Council in December 1959 a ten year program for strengthening NATO and giving it the power to carry on large scale nuclear warfare as well as greater flexibility to conduct local warfare; 6) was stepping up the armament of West Germany with nuclear arms and missiles.

In the Chinese view, the essence of America's two-faced strategy of talking peace while preparing for war was that it was a maneuver designed to "win time to regain military superiority." To support this view, People's Daily cited a report by an American research group to the effect that the major problem facing the U.S. in the early 1960's was the need to eliminate the missile gap. Since this task could not be achieved rapidly, according to the report, even if a shock plan were instituted, gaining time was of the utmost importance.

In sum, the Chinese interpretation of American detente tactics was that they were nothing more than a maneuver to buy the necessary time to overcome Soviet military superiority. By implication, this meant that those people, such as Khrushchev, who thought that any meaningful detente could be achieved even for a limited period, were in fact playing into the hands of the West. For while the bloc was making unilateral arms cuts and while bloc vigilance was being undermined by the phony "spirit of Camp David," the West would be

stealthily trying to gain the missile lead and to strengthen its military position. In a final show of exasperation, People's Daily contended that this American double-dealing was being recognized for what it was by "more and more people from East to West" and "though it still may deceive some people at present, it cannot fool them for long." In short, even Khrushchev would soon awaken.

In the first 1960 issue of Red Flag, Yu Chao-li reasserted in terms similar to those cited about the Chinese argument against a detente. The U.S. was pursuing a two-faced strategy of putting out a smokescreen of peace while continuing to suppress the national liberation movements and to build up its military position throughout the world. To strengthen peace it was necessary to continue to strengthen the struggle against U.S. imperialism; all viewpoints which overestimated the strength of the enemy and underestimated the strength of the people were wrong.

An article in another Chinese journal on 3 January put the warning even more blatantly. If the bloc took the Western desire for peace at face value and failed to see that the West was really interested in gaining time to recoup its strength, it would be led to disaster:

> We are wrong if we fail to see the 'two hands' of the imperialists. It will be even worse /for us/ if we should mistake their secondary policy /seeking a relaxation of tension/ for their main policy /regaining their strength/.

GDR Delegation in Peiping

That Mao was taking his case against Soviet tactics to the Communist world was indicated again in January during the visit to Peiping of an East German government delegation headed by GDR Deputy Premier Henrich Rau. Mao [redacted] told the East Germans that he disagreed with Soviet policy on disarmament and Berlin. He did not believe that a satisfactory disarmament agreement could be achieved by negotiation and he believed that the military might of the camp should be used to force the West to accept the Soviet disarmament proposals. Mao further said that Communist China would not sign any disarmament agreement unless it was given its legitimate seat in the United Nations and unless the United States withdrew from Taiwan. The Chinese also [redacted] vehemently told the East Germans not to support the Soviet plan for a free and demilitarized West Berlin because West Berlin was unquestionably

part and parcel of East Germany. The Western powers, the Chinese reportedly believed, should be thrown out of Berlin.

Differences Over Disarmament

In his long speech to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960, Khrushchev sketched the outlines of a comprehensive military strategic doctrine, bringing together the ideas about modern war he had been propounding publicly since mid-1957. In essence, this doctrine is based on the dominant role of strategic nuclear weapons in modern war. In contrast to the old battlefield-oriented concept of war prevalent in past Soviet military doctrine, Khrushchev contended that in the future war "there would be little to resemble previous wars," that war would "begin in the heart of the warring countries" and that every strategic area would be subjected to attack during the "first minutes" of war.

Against the background of this latest step in the strategic revolution in Soviet military thinking that had been going on in the USSR since 1955, Khrushchev proposed a one-third cut in the Soviet armed forces from 3.6 to 2.4 million men--contending that this troop reduction would save 16 to 17 billion rubles a year for the Soviet economy and that it would not in the least diminish Soviet fire power or reduce the effectiveness of its deterrent. Khrushchev further offered the "hope" that "other countries" would follow the road to curtailment of their armed forces, expressed the view that disarmament "paves the way for stable peace and economic development for all countries and all people," and contended that the money saved could be used to aid all the economically underdeveloped countries. On 2 June, after the collapse of the summit, the USSR offered a new disarmament program in which several of the above-mentioned Khrushchev statements were reiterated.

Whether or not Khrushchev was seriously interested in reaching a disarmament agreement, it was apparent that the Chinese Communists doubted the wisdom both of the Soviet troop cut and of the disarmament program.

Two days after Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech, a 16 January People's Daily editorial applauded the disarmament aspects of the speech as a manifestation of the Soviet desire for peace and as an example of Soviet confidence in its own strength. At the same time, the Chinese paper contended that the U.S. was building up its military strength in order to facilitate its capabilities for both total and limited war, noted that West Germany would soon expand its own troops by

one-third and suggested that the United States was not eager for disarmament but only for an "arms drive in preparation for war."

To skip ahead for a moment, Chinese objections to Soviet disarmament policy were to become even more explicit in June. On 7 June, two days after the new Soviet disarmament proposals had been presented to the West, a People's Daily editorial insisted polemically that the bloc must "strengthen" rather than reduce its armed forces.

> ...in the face of the armed-to-the-teeth, ambitious imperialist bloc headed by U.S. imperialism, it is entirely necessary for the socialist countries to maintain a high degree of vigilance and strengthen their armed forces in order to defend their socialist homelands and preserve world peace. (emphasis supplied)

One day later, on 8 June, the Chinese delegate to the WFTU Meeting in Peiping, Liu Chang-sheng, a member of the central committee, all but openly criticized the Soviet troop cut and Soviet disarmament policy in general. Liu went so far as to extract specific quotations from Khrushchev's 14 January speech and the subsequent Soviet disarmament proposal for purposes of refutation and ridicule. He began his remarks on the Soviet disarmament proposals by claiming that "people" who took those proposals seriously were suffering from an "unrealistic illusion."

> The purpose of putting forward such a proposal is to arouse the people throughout the world to unite and oppose the imperialist scheme for arms drives and war preparations, to unmask the aggressive and bellicose nature of imperialism.... But there are people who believe that such a proposal can be realized while imperialism still exists and that the danger of war can be eliminated by relying on such a proposal. This is an unrealistic illusion.

Elsewhere in his speech, Liu quoted without attribution and rejected Khrushchev's view that arms funds could be used for "'assisting underdeveloped countries'"--a "downright whitewash" of imperialism. Nor could one say--and again he was paraphrasing Khrushchev's 14 January speech--that disarmament could "'bring general progress to people as a whole.'" A world without armament, said Liu, was possible only "when the socialist revolution is victorious throughout the world."

A still further indication that the Chinese were annoyed by Soviet disarmament policy was Liu's insistence that "the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries should continue to develop their lead in the sphere of atomic energy"--the implication being that a disarmament agreement, particularly a test ban, would inhibit that lead from being maintained and developed and would particularly inhibit China from becoming a nuclear power. Finally, Liu implied that any disarmament agreement was worthless because even after its conclusion "imperialism can still tear it to pieces."

Why should Peiping have objected to unilateral Soviet troop cuts and Soviet disarmament proposals? Khrushchev himself provided one possible answer in his 14 January speech when he asked--for purposes of refutation--whether or not the troop cut would "undermine" the Soviet deterrent. Khrushchev claimed that it would not, because, as he had stated many times before, the West was deterred both from all-out and local war by Soviet strategic weapons. Mao, on the other hand, had been contending for some years that although the West was deterred for the time being from general war, it was not deterred from local wars. Mao may well have been concerned that the Soviet troop cut would undermine the Soviet capability to fight precisely the kind of war that Mao regarded as "inevitable"--local wars.

Mao may also have been concerned with the long range drift of Soviet disarmament policy. Although it is generally assumed in the West that Khrushchev is not seriously interested in a disarmament agreement, it is difficult to reconcile this view with the very obvious concern expressed in Liu Chang-sheng's remarks on 8 June about "people" who think that the danger of war can be eliminated by "relying" on disarmament proposals. Even if Mao exaggerated the seriousness of Soviet disarmament proposals, there seemed to be a serious Chinese concern that the USSR might be jeopardizing its military superiority. Last and certainly not least, Peiping may well have feared that the signing of a test ban with the West would obliterate its own chances to become a nuclear power. Just one week after Khrushchev's 14 January speech, Peiping--in its first statement in more than two years on disarmament--flatly proclaimed that it would not be bound by any disarmament agreements to which it was not a party and signatory.

Another point made by Khrushchev in his Supreme Soviet speech that must have been read with great interest, if not dismay, in Peiping was about the relative military strength of the two camps. In a key passage, Khrushchev stated that "impregnability is a rather relative concept," that is, that

the USSR's enemies "will not be marking time /and/ can make good their temporary lagging /in nuclear weapons/...and may, sooner or later, draw even with us." Khrushchev watered down this possibility a paragraph later when he contended that meanwhile the USSR would not "sit with arms folded," but he nonetheless left open the possibility that the West would reach a state of nuclear parity with the USSR in the near future, perhaps five years. Peiping was presumably not pleased by such an admission inasmuch as the Chinese had been contending since 1957 that the West could never catch up if the USSR did not fall victim to the spirit of detente and reduce its military program.

Differences in the Front Organizations

During the first two months of 1960, Moscow and Peiping clashed in two Communist front organizations--the World Peace Council, meeting in January, and the International Union of Students' executive council, meeting in February. In January, at the WPC executive committee meeting in Rome, the differences between Moscow and Peiping were, [redacted] so acute that the Chinese member of the executive committee boycotted the two-day discussion on the international situation. The main rapporteur, the British delegate, John Bernal, reportedly spoke at length about Sino-Soviet differences regarding the concentration of propaganda efforts on the European situation (as the Russians wanted) or on support of the colonial struggle (as the Chinese wanted). The Soviet delegate intervened in the discussion to reject the Chinese "accusation" that the USSR wanted to isolate Peiping and was following a policy aimed at reaching a "modus vivendi" with the Americans--a Chinese charge subsequently reported by other sources. The discussion reportedly went on for more than two hours without reaching "even a minimum of clarification" primarily because there was a general tendency to acquiesce to the Soviets.

In February 1960, at the IUS executive committee meeting in Tunis, there were Sino-Soviet differences over the question of cooperation with Western student groups. According to Belgrade radio, the Chinese offered formal amendments to dilute the Soviet-sponsored resolution calling for the exploration of the possibility of greater cooperation with the Western student organization. Moreover, the Chinese abstained on several of the 11 resolutions adopted. According to Belgrade, the IUS executive adopted a broad program of practical cooperation with Western and Yugoslav students groups which was carried with only one dissenting vote, that of the Chinese delegation.

The Warsaw Pact Conference: February, 1960

The conference of the political consultative committee of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty in early February was called by the Russians to coordinate bloc strategy for the forthcoming summit meeting but, of equal importance, to discuss the pressing issues of global strategy that divided Moscow from Peiping and threatened to divide the bloc as a whole. It is reliably reported that efforts at conciliation failed, a conclusion supported by the outbreak of violent polemics from the Chinese just two months later.

Before going into the details of the conflict that developed at the meeting itself, it might be instructive to examine some of the evidence that joint Chinese-East German pressure for nuclear weapons sharing was brought to bear on the Russians on the very eve of the conference. On 28 January, Ulbricht announced in a strongly worded warning to the West Germans that the East German government would request its allies to put rocket weapons at its disposal in order to cope with the threat of West German atomic armament. Ulbricht had already indicated his intention to do so in an 18 page letter he had sent to Adenauer on 26 January. The difference in the Soviet and Chinese reaction to this East German threat was striking. Moscow repeated it a few times in foreign language broadcasts to Germany, but it offered no authoritative comment either approving Ulbricht's suggestion or indicating that it might comply. If the Ulbricht threat had been a maneuver conducted beforehand with the Russians to intimidate the West Germans and to discourage West Germany from seeking nuclear weapons, it is hard to understand why the Russians did not seize on the Ulbricht initiative to dramatize the threat.

In contrast to Moscow's marked restraint on the issue, a People's Daily editorial on 4 February--on the very eve of the Warsaw Pact conference--said that the request was "not only fully justified but necessary." This Chinese support for the proposal can be compared with the 5 February declaration of the Warsaw Treaty states which took an optimistic view of the "definite change for the better" in the international situation and made no mention of the possibility that Moscow might transfer rocket weapons to East Germany. In fact, the declaration referred once again to the possibility of a nuclear free zone in Europe which would include the GDR.

While it might seem improbable that Ulbricht should have been trying, with Chinese support, to force the Soviet hand on the matter, the opposite assumption, that the Russians may have decided to proceed with the atomic armament of East

Germany at this moment, six weeks before the 10-power disarmament conference and three months before the summit, looks even more unlikely. And, if the gambit were a joint GDR-Soviet one, it is difficult, as already indicated, to understand why Moscow did not join in more enthusiastically.

If the Chinese did encourage such an East German initiative, it is not hard to see the reason. The Chinese may have well have believed that if the Russians could be pressed into granting a nuclear capability--however limited and restricted--to the East Germans, the case against such a nuclear capability for China would be drastically weakened.

Continuing Soviet resistance to pressures for nuclear-weapons sharing was suggested the very next month in an undated letter addressed by Khrushchev to the European Federation Against Atomic Armament, made public by TASS on 18 March. Released about six weeks after President Eisenhower had intimated, at his press conference of 3 February, the possibility that the United States would share nuclear weapons with its European allies, the letter was clearly calculated to warn that such a step would force the USSR to follow suit. Khrushchev stressed the "undesirability of expansion of the so-called atomic club" and cautioned that U.S. action to supply nuclear weapons to its allies would set off "a kind of chain reaction in the dissemination of nuclear weapons all over the world." It is of interest, in this connection, that Soviet news reports on the President's press conference stressed the unlikelihood that Congress would amend the law in order to permit nuclear-weapons diffusion while Chinese news reports concentrated on the likelihood that such nuclear diffusion would take place.

To turn to the conference itself, the 4 February report of the Chinese delegate, or "observer" Kang Sheng, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, was clearly a minority report.* It differed notably, both in tone and in substance, from the much milder Declaration issued by the Warsaw Treaty members on 5 February. Kang acknowledged that "certain procedural agreements had been reached" on disarmament, but he attributed this not to the good will of the West but rather to the "repeated struggles" by socialist forces and national revolutionary forces throughout the world. He reiterated the now-standard Chinese line that American talk about "peace" was merely a stratagem to lull the bloc. He added the significant new charge that this stratagem was also designed to "dismember the socialist camp," i.e., was deliberately designed to produce Sino-Soviet tensions. Moreover, said Kang,

* The CCP is credibly reported to have protested later that Kang's role was restricted and his views ignored.

the American "peace" strategem was designed to encourage a "peaceful evolution" in the socialist countries, an indication of Chinese fears that a Soviet-American rapprochement would lead to the growth of revisionism and other centrifugal forces in the individual communist states.

Kang was most emphatic in his veiled argument against the Soviet disarmament policy. The burden of his argument was that the U.S. would never agree to any real disarmament plan. At the same time, indicating China's own refusal to disarm, he falsely alleged that existing Chinese forces were less than half their original size and reiterated the position taken by his government on 21 January that the CPR would not be bound by any disarmament agreement in which it did not participate. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact declaration said that the "Warsaw Treaty countries," of which China is not one, "arrived at the conclusion that the situation is now more favorable than ever before for fruitful disarmament talks."

After detailing American military threats and provocations, Kang went on to implicitly rebuke the USSR for its failure to support China in its disputes with India and Indonesia. The CCP, he said, had always "regarded an attack against any socialist country by the imperialists and reactionaries as an attack against China."

The impasse that must have developed between the Chinese and the Russians at the Warsaw meeting is suggested further by the fact that Kang Sheng's speech was not reported nor even mentioned by any bloc media except those of China.

On 6 February, a People's Daily editorial reviewing the Warsaw meeting struck hard at Soviet policy. "It is impossible not to see," it began polemically, that the West had in fact stepped up its arms drive--the clear implication being that this was no time for talk of disarmament. The American peace strategem, it warned, was designed to "subvert, corrupt, split and destroy the socialist camp." It was a "vicious and sinister strategem."

In addition to the public evidence of Sino-Soviet discord at the Pact conference, there are [redacted] reports of the nature and scope of the behind-the-scenes Sino-Soviet conflict at the Pact meeting. According to the first, the USSR, supported by the East European satellites, alleged that West Germany was the greatest immediate threat to the socialist camp and that the best policy to follow in such conditions would be to lessen world tensions and to reach a rapprochement with the West, particularly the United States, so that the German problem could be solved. The Asian Bloc, led by the Chinese, argued that the United States was the only

enemy of Communism, first, last and always, and that one should deal with it only from an uncompromising position of strength. It may be recalled that Khrushchev in his 14 January speech asserted that only "madmen" could contemplate a general war under current conditions; and he went on to indicate that the nearest thing to a madman then in view was, not any American leader, but Chancellor Adenauer, who was denounced at great length. The Soviet desire to concentrate its fire for the moment on West Germany rather than the United States is an example of the kind of flexible differentiation tactics used by Khrushchev to probe differences in the Western alliance--tactics disapproved by Peiping on the apparent grounds that Khrushchev was overestimating his ability to split the Western allies and that, in any case, fire should be concentrated on the main enemy, the United States.

According to the second source, Khrushchev made the main speech at the conference and attacked recent Chinese actions (i.e., the border dispute with India and the overseas Chinese dispute with Indonesia) in strong terms. Khrushchev said that these actions had compromised the Bloc's policy of friendship with the non-Communist countries and had thus forfeited much support for the Communist cause. Khrushchev also reportedly criticized the severe attitude adopted by the Chinese towards Yugoslavia, on the similar grounds that the persistent Chinese attacks created disunity among the bloc countries. Khrushchev also complained that the Chinese had refused to support the USSR's attempts to reduce world tension. China, he said, had not followed the USSR's lead by demobilizing any part of its armed forces and had failed to support Soviet disarmament policies and the banning of atomic weapons. Khrushchev further reportedly alleged that the Chinese party was too insistent on following its own independent policies, and that China's refusal to associate itself more closely with economic and political policies adopted by the other socialist countries towards the rest of the world was harming the cause of Communism.

This general attack on the Chinese, delivered before representatives of the entire bloc, illustrated the gravity of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev probably hoped that his harsh criticism would make Peiping reconsider its course; he also probably hoped to forestall any influence that China's independent views might have on the actions of other satellite regimes. He evidently failed, however, to forestall the Asian satellites from supporting Peiping, and he may not have completely obliterated sympathy for Peiping in East Germany, Albania and Czechoslovakia--each of which had in the past demonstrated considerable antipathy to Khrushchev's coexistence tactics.

Konev's Speech to the Pact Conference

Some revealing clarification of Soviet strategic thinking was provided at the Warsaw Pact meeting in an unpublished speech by Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, the recently replaced commander of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Konev reportedly began his speech to the Defense Ministers of the bloc countries by contending that there were only two ways of exit from the current state of affairs: either complete disarmament and coexistence, or the continuation of the cold war and the possibility of a "hot" war. It was not necessary to explain, he went on, that the Soviet Union was counting on not letting a war occur. Konev went on to recount the radical changes in the international situation since the end of World War II that benefited the bloc, but he cautioned that the bloc had not overtaken the West in all the basic military and industrial fields and particularly that the Western industrial and economic potential still exceeded that of the bloc. He continued that the peaceful evolution of the bloc would lead to unprecedented power within a few years and that, in the meantime, bloc policy was not to permit the occurrence of war of any kind for any reason. Konev went on to suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States had reached a state of weapons parity which nullified the use of rocket and nuclear weapons--particularly inasmuch as neither side had an effective means of defense against rocket weapons. The lack of defense against rocket weapons, said Konev, was the core of the matter and, was at the root of the Soviet issue to negotiate.

He continued by arguing that the question of rocket defense was now occupying first place in Soviet military thinking.

In sum, Konev's rationale for the detente tactics pursued by Khrushchev was that Soviet defenses and overall Soviet strength were not yet strong enough to warrant an attack on the United States or to accept any risk of general war. Konev was asserting in the most unequivocal manner the Soviet belief in, and the rationale for, mutual deterrence.

Konev's emphasis on the lack of an effective defense against missiles was consistent with statements made by Khrushchev in his 14 January speech to the Supreme Soviet--that only "madmen" could contemplate war now, that the USSR as well as the West would "suffer great calamities" in a general war (although less than the West), that "impregnability is a rather relative concept," and that modern methods of waging

war did not give "any country" a sufficient advantage to justify an attack. Neither Khrushchev nor Konev closed the door to the possibility that the USSR would have an effective defense before the United States would--at which time Moscow might adopt a strike-first strategy--but as of early 1960 neither Khrushchev nor Konev appeared to be confident of that achievement in the foreseeable future and the Soviet party apparently had not adopted such a strategy. On the contrary, Moscow seemed to be confident that the Bloc could strengthen itself, by means short of war, to a point--possibly in or around 1970--from which the world revolution could advance rapidly to a final triumph, still without a general war. In the meantime, the Soviet party seemed anxious to prevent the international situation from deteriorating to a point where one side or the other might undertake a surprise attack. It was precisely on this question of acceptable risk that Peiping most emphatically disagreed.

War and Peace

On 16 February, the periodical China Youth published a series of 13 questions and answers on the subject of war and peace which represent one of the frankest and most enlightening Chinese discussions of the question ever published in open media. A close examination of these questions and answers is helpful to an understanding of the fine points of the Chinese view on the likelihood of war, and on the possibility and means of averting it.

The 13 theses may be summarized as follows: 1) it is increasingly difficult for imperialism to provoke a world war, owing to the growing strength of the bloc, its neutralist friends and the forces of peace; 2) the principal reason why the U.S. dares not strike is that the USSR has superiority in missiles; 3) despite the Soviet military lead and despite the fact that time is on the bloc's side, it is impossible to say that war will not break out, because as long as imperialism exists there remains the danger of war; 4) by using peace as a camouflage, the West is trying to gain time to expand its armaments and close the missile gap; 5) the struggle for disarmament is a long and complex one and "no results are possible immediately" because imperialism cannot do away with armaments; for this reason, to rest the hope of lasting peace on the possibility of reaching a disarmament agreement is to indulge in a dream; 6) war is inseparable from class struggle and aggression, and wars are the necessary fruits of imperialism; 7) it is possible to strive for a fairly long period of peace but, at the same time, we need "to strengthen our own resources, hold fast to Marxist-Leninist policies,

expose ceaselessly imperialist schemes, arouse the fighting spirit of the worlds people and maintain a lasting struggle...;" 8) a "warless world" can be brought about only by the abolition of the imperialism; 9) we seek peace but never beg it from the imperialists; 10) we must support all "just revolutionary wars" in order to weaken imperialism and secure peace; 11) we cannot seek peace by compromise; 12) there is no foundation to the view that war can never again be the means of settling international disputes because we can never be sure that imperialism will relinquish war; 13) we oppose war but we do not fear it.

The implications of these theses--all of which have been reiterated--for bloc policy are evident: the cold war cannot be abated; the danger of war will continue to exist and the bloc must prepare for all contingencies; disarmament negotiations are more or less useless; the bloc should concentrate first of all not on negotiations with the West but on building its own resources and securing its own strength; and the bloc must actively support all "just" wars.

III. THE LENIN ANNIVERSARY POLEMICS

The Chinese Communist indictment of Soviet strategy, which had begun in a low key in the fall of 1957 and had become increasingly shrill in the period shortly before Khrushchev's trip to the United States, reached a new pitch in spring 1960. Using the 22 April anniversary of Lenin's birth as a peg, the Chinese offered a comprehensive indictment of Soviet theory, strategy, and tactics in the form of five lengthy and acrimonious doctrinal statements, two in Red Flag (1 and 19 April), two in People's Daily (22 and 25 April) and a speech on the anniversary itself by Politburo member Lu Ting-i. The initial Soviet reply came in Politburo member Kuusinen's anniversary address on 22 April, subsequently in articles in Pravda and Soviet Russia in June, and finally from Khrushchev himself at the Rumanian Party Congress the same month.

Until the publication of the Lenin anniversary articles, the Chinese Communist attacks on Soviet strategy--and the doctrine which reflected that strategy--had generally been cryptic and moderate. The Chinese Lenin anniversary articles were of such a far-reaching and fundamental nature that they could only be compared in importance to such water-sheds in the post-Stalin era as Khrushchev's secret speech of February 1956. With copious documentation from Lenin and Marx and pointed references to the ideas of some of Communism's most notorious heretics such as Bernstein, Kautsky and Tito, the Chinese in effect accused Khrushchev of "revising, emasculating and betraying" the most fundamental and sacred tenets of Leninism. Such an attack could not but have the effect of calling into question Khrushchev's leadership of the Communist movement.

The three principal targets of the Chinese fire were the very three basic ideological innovations which Khrushchev personally had presented to the 20th party congress and which provided the doctrinal rationalization for his more flexible post-Stalin global strategy. These were Khrushchev's new doctrine on peaceful coexistence, on the non-inevitability of war, and on the possibility of peaceful accession to power in non-Communist countries. The Chinese articles rejected all three of Khrushchev's innovations: they advocated a much narrower definition of coexistence which in effect meant the continuation of the cold war; they contended that wars, particularly local and colonial wars, were inevitable so long as imperialism remained; and they minimized the possibility of peaceful roads to power in the non-Communist world.

In attacking Khrushchev's ideological innovations and the new strategy which these innovations reflected, the Chinese were not calling for general war or contending that general war was inevitable, although they may have thought it inevitable. They were attacking Khrushchev's gradualist revolutionary conception and putting forth an alternative conception based on the conviction that the West could be defeated sooner than Khrushchev thought if the USSR and the world Communist movement were more aggressive. The Chinese had sanquine estimates of the revolutionary potential in many areas, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They believed that the Soviet deterrent could be invoked to underwrite revolutionary action in many of these areas with only a minimal risk of global war. They feared that Soviet gradualism would unnecessarily delay the revolution in the short run and perhaps lead to stagnation in the long run. Intertwined with this fear, presumably was the belief that Khrushchev's gradualism was much too confining for Chinese aspirations towards Taiwan and for its role as the self-appointed leader of the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped areas.

Before going into the details of the polemics, three observations might be offered. The first is that the Chinese attack on Soviet strategy--while allowing for the obvious oversimplifications and misrepresentation of that strategy--cannot be understood outside the context of the shift in Soviet strategy in recent years. The Soviet professed desire for detente is generally put in quotation marks in the West. Such skepticism is undoubtedly warranted if it is meant to apply to the view that Khrushchev is interested in detente for detente's sake or in achieving lasting peace in terms of the present status quo. He believes and indeed has said that he can use a detente to extend the Soviet sphere of influence and to undermine the Western alliance system. Yet he appears to believe that he can achieve these goals without resorting to the actual use of Soviet armed force and with a minimum of armed violence on the part of Communist parties throughout the world.

The second observation is that the Chinese anniversary attack was probably not a direct attempt to sabotage the summit meeting scheduled for May. Khrushchev's summit diplomacy was only a symptom and not a root cause of Sino-Soviet strategic differences. Chinese comment on the eve of the summit made it evident that Mao expected the summit to be held even though he expected little "progress" to be

made.* Finally, the Chinese attack must be viewed in the context of the accumulation of two and a half years of frustration with Soviet tactics. In the Chinese view, the Soviet leaders were not only exercising excessive caution but even where they were exerting the most pressure--i.e., on Berlin--this pressure was being exerted in behalf of Soviet and not Chinese aspirations. The Chinese may well have thought that while Khrushchev was taking steps to clean up his own backyard by "normalizing" the situation in Germany, he should have been willing to exert similar pressure to "normalize" the situation in Communist China's own backyard, i.e. Taiwan. Similarly, while Khrushchev's negotiations tactics were aimed at making gains for the USSR in Europe--i.e. the weakening of the Western alliance system and the Western recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe--there were relatively few advantages of such tactics for the Chinese and considerable disadvantages. An agreement on a nuclear test ban, for example, reached by a compromise on Berlin, could endanger Chinese aspirations to become a nuclear power.

Peaceful Coexistence or Continuation of Cold War

One of the three issues in debate between Moscow and Peiping on the Lenin anniversary polemics was the question of peaceful coexistence. Neither rejected the concept but the Soviets placed their emphasis on the need for something more stable than a mere armed truce while the Chinese put their emphasis on the impossibility and undesirability of anything more stable than a temporary armed truce. Because the Chinese believed that local wars and armed rebellion were inevitable, they could see no prospect for a genuine detente except by sacrificing potential gains.

The question of coexistence was defined by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 as one of three "fundamental questions" of present day international development. He told the Congress and he has been saying since, that Communism could triumph peacefully, that it was a question of coexistence or "the most destructive war in history," and that the opposing camps must do more than exist side by side but must "proceed further, to improve relations, strengthen confidence and cooperate."

* [redacted] alleges that a Chinese delegation in Moscow on the eve of the summit sought to have Khrushchev scuttle the conference.

Although Khrushchev's professed desire for relaxing tensions is--as mentioned earlier--properly regarded with much skepticism in the West, there does appear in this case to be a relationship between his protestations and his calculations. Khrushchev appears to believe he can use a detente to wreck the Western alliance system and to seduce the uncommitted countries. He seems to think that the achievement of these goals would be retarded by the use of bloc armed force or by armed coups on the part of local Communist parties; he is prepared for a long-range political and ideological struggle with the West in which history is on his side; his policy is fundamentally tempered by his fear of nuclear war, and he calculates that a continuation of the cold war without any relief could lead to a hot war he does not want. The rigidities and consequent failures of Stalinist foreign policy would in any case--even if the post-Stalin Soviet leadership had not been confronted with the nuclear era--have dictated a more flexible foreign policy. The coalescence of these various factors in Soviet thinking--the fear of nuclear war, the confidence in peaceful triumph, the desire for greater flexibility--help explain the Soviet desire for detente.

Soviet awareness of the technological imperative was posed in the sharpest terms yet by Kuusinen on 22 April 1960:

> ...war, using new means of mass destruction, would be madness. Such are the dialectics of military-technical progress that new weapons of war begin to exert pressure on behalf of peace. To Marxists there is nothing puzzling in this. The classics of Marxism have never denied that new weapons not only produce a revolution in the art of war but can influence policy too.... Lenin, as Krupskaya relates, foresaw that 'the time will come when war will become so destructive as to be impossible.' (emphasis supplied)

In this remarkable passage, the Soviet ideologue was elevating nuclear weapons to an importance never anticipated in orthodox doctrine, which held with Lenin that, so long as imperialism remained, war was inevitable. Kuusinen was in effect elevating these new weapons to the role of an independent agent in the historical process which could produce a revolution so profound that it "could influence policy." That the Russians were hard pressed to justify this inversion of Marxism-Leninism is apparent from the fact that they were forced to quote not Lenin or Marx but Lenin's widow, Krupskaya.

The fact that Kuusinen made such a basic assault on the bedrock of Leninist ideology is good evidence of the realistic Soviet appreciation of the consequences of nuclear war.

Kuusinen also posed in the sharpest terms yet offered by any Soviet spokesman the Soviet confidence in their eventual ability to triumph over the West with a minimum of revolutionary violence.

> Naturally the task (of peaceful economic competition) is difficult. But we say and have said that socialism has the strength of example. Violence has a strength in relation to those who want to establish its power. But with this the significance of violence exhausts itself, for after that it is influence and example that will tell. It is necessary to show, in a practical way, by example, the significance of Communism. This is what Ilyich said. (emphasis supplied)

Elsewhere, Kuusinen projected the "main trends of historical progress" in the second half of the 20th century; the prospect was for the year 2000 to dawn with most or much of the Western world still non-Communist. He predicted no gains in territory for the bloc and in fact minimized the possibility of successful Communist revolutions in the Western capitalist countries even by the dawn of a new century.

The need for flexibility and elasticity in formulating policy and tactics was also strongly defended in the Soviet replies to the Chinese. Matkovskiy, deputy director of the Central Committee's Institute for Marxism-Leninism, wrote in Pravda on 12 June that only left wing Communists would deny "possible compromises" and, quoting Lenin, asserted that compromises were not to be equated with opportunism. Then he stated one of the most essential elements in Soviet strategy--the belief that differences in the Western alliance could be exploited by a readiness to make temporary accommodations:

> Lenin taught that one could not wage the most complex struggle for Communism, the struggle against the international bourgeoisie, while rejecting out of hand agreements and compromises on individual issues with possible--be it only temporary--allies, and the exploitation of contradictions--be they only temporary ones--among the interests of the enemies. By compromising in some instances, in the interests of the development of the revolutionary movement, Communists are not deviating from their positions of principle.

Kuusinen made the related point that Soviet policy also differentiated among Western leaders and that such differentiation tactics were essential.

> Division among influential bourgeois circles in undoubtedly significant for the success of the struggle for peace. Lenin has already pointed out that it is not a matter of indifference to us whether we are dealing with those representatives of the bourgeois camp who are attracted to a military solution of the question, or with those representatives of the bourgeois camp who are attracted to pacifism....

In short, Moscow justified its tactics on the grounds that an undifferentiated hostility towards the United States and towards all Western leaders would not enable the USSR to exploit differences of view and interests among the Western allies and Western statesmen.

The Chinese rejected all three Soviet explanations of their coexistence tactics: that nuclear weapons left no other choice but a more moderate approach to the West, that the bloc could ultimately triumph with a minimum of revolutionary violence, and that it was necessary to pursue bloc aims with a maximum of flexibility.

On the question of nuclear weapons, Red Flag dismissed them on 19 April in these terms:

> ...whichever way you look at it, none of the new techniques, such as atomic energy, rocketry and the like, has changed the basic characteristics of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution pointed out by Lenin.

On the question of peaceful triumph, the Chinese argued that peaceful coexistence was "conditional" and a "temporary breathing space (which) can always come to an end." In the Chinese view, coexistence would have to be interrupted periodically either by imperialist-launched "unjust" wars or by historically inevitable "just" wars for national liberation or capitalist emancipation, both of which the bloc must support.

On the question of flexibility, Peiping contended that Soviet tactics were diluting firm Leninist principles and straying toward opportunism. We have already seen that at the Warsaw Pact conference the Chinese strongly objected to one aspect of Moscow's tactics--focusing on West Germany

rather than the U.S. as the main enemy at the moment. These objections were again voiced by People's Daily on 22 April and by Lu Ting-i. People's Daily wrote

> It is entirely necessary to oppose militarism in West Germany and Japan and militarism fostered by the U.S. in other countries. But now it is the war policy of U.S. imperialism that plays the decisive role in all this. Departing from this point is departing from the heart and essence of the matter. If the peace-loving people of the world do not concentrate their strength on exposing this war policy of the American authorities and continually wage a serious unflinching struggle against it, the result will inevitably be grievous calamity. (emphasis supplied)

Lu Ting-i said:

> ...if the proletariat in the capitalist countries is to win emancipation, if the people of the colonies and semi-colonies are to obtain national liberation, if the people of the world are to safeguard world peace, the spearhead of the struggle must be directed against U.S. imperialism. (emphasis supplied)

Still another Chinese objection to Moscow's flexible tactics concerned the strategy for the "peace" movement. In the Soviet view, the fight for "peace"--and the disruption of the Western alliance which is the principal goal of this fight--was the most important goal of the present stage. To achieve this goal, Moscow believed that the "peace" movement should concentrate exclusively on peace and should not handicap or expose itself as a Communist tool by supporting wars, such as the Algerian, for example, which the Communists regard as "just." To the Chinese, putting "peace" before "just" wars was bad tactics. They probably believed that the world Communist movement--and they personally--had more to gain by keeping alive the Algerian rebellion than by disrupting NATO--a goal which they probably regarded as illusory in any case. For such reasons, Lu Ting-i appealed polemically for a "merging" of the struggle for peace with the struggle for liberation:

> In order to oppose the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism, all the world's revolutionary and peace-loving forces must be united. World peace can be further defended and effectively defended only by merging the struggle of the

> peoples of the socialist countries, the national liberation struggle of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in the capitalist countries and the struggle of all people's for peace, forming them into a mighty anti-imperialist front and dealing firm blows at the imperialist policies of aggression and war...
> Separation from the liberation struggles of colonies and semi-colonies and from the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and working people in the capitalist countries, will greatly weaken the forces in defense of world peace and serve the interests of imperialism. (emphasis supplied)

"Peaceful" Revolution or Armed Uprisings and Violence

Throughout Communist history, there has always been controversy between those on the right who have maximized and those on the left who have minimized the possibilities for peaceful acquisition of power. A similar and related controversy has existed between those on the right who believe that since revolution is inevitable, it needs little outside stimulation (poltalkivaniya) and those on the left who, agreeing it is inevitable, nonetheless believe in helping it along.

At the 20th party congress in 1956, Khrushchev had taken a big step toward the rightist position. He deemed it "quite probable" that the forms of transition to socialism would become "more and more varied" and that these forms "need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances." Violence and civil war, he contended, were not the "only way" to remake society. Particularly in the highly developed capitalist countries, where it was a traditional institution, parliament might become an agency of "genuine democracy" for the working people--i.e., a vehicle for Communist control. Khrushchev further implied that the peaceful path to power might be particularly possible in those capitalist countries where capitalism was weak--i.e., in the former colonial countries. For, he seemed to suggest, capitalist resistance would be greatest in those countries which were most advanced:

> The winning of a firm parliamentary majority based on the mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and of the working people would create conditions for the working class of many capitalist and formerly colonial countries to make fundamental social changes.

> Of course, in those countries where capitalism is still strong, where it possesses a tremendous military and police machine, serious resistance by reactionary forces is inevitable. The transition to socialism in these countries will take place amid sharp revolutionary class struggle. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, despite the qualifiers and escape clauses, the dominant impression left by the 20th Congress revision was that the chances for peaceful takeover in the West were quite good, particularly in the weaker capitalist countries, but not excluding the more advanced countries. As we have seen, the new textbook of Communist strategy issued in the fall of 1959 took a step forward in this rightist course. It defined indefinitely the question of Communist takeover of power in the more advanced countries and strengthened the doctrinal rationalization for achieving power peacefully.

This emphasis on the possibility of peaceful takeover was pronounced in Kuusinen's April 1960 reply to the Chinese. Projecting ahead to the year 2000, Kuusinen held out little hope for any kind of a Communist takeover in the advanced capitalist countries--he said he could offer no "firm prospects" for the development of these countries--and, regarding the colonial and former colonial countries, he predicted that the second half of the century, "judging by everything, will be marked by a complete liberation of the oppressed peoples and dependent countries." That is, the colonial countries would have completely eliminated Western political and economic influence, but they would not necessarily be non-Communist. This timetable did not seem predicated on a maximum of direct revolutionary violence.

The Soviet belief that overtaking the West in economic production would provide the key to the future was reflected in the four goals that Kuusinen posited for the year 2000. First, he predicted that the USSR would overtake the West in per capita output, then in the volume of national income, then in the level of labor productivity, and finally in the level of per capita consumption. Second, after these goals were achieved, a complete Communist society would be built in the USSR. The other countries of the camp would "march up the hill with the USSR." Third, there would be the "complete liberation" of the colonial countries. And finally, the peace forces would grow to such an extent that "any war" would become impossible. Gone was Kaganovich's bold prediction of 1955 that the 20th Century would see the worldwide victory of Communism.

Khrushchev's defense of this slow revolutionary timetable was that revolutions could not be made without thorough preparation, particularly in the colonial countries where conditions had "not yet matured." Shevlyagin, writing in Soviet Russia on 10 June, warned against "terrible revolutionaries" eager to spread revolution where conditions are not ripe:

> Lenin understood the good intentions of comrades who hasten to race ahead and to speed up the advent of the socialist revolution, but he warned very decidedly against the danger of their transformation into Blanquists.... Lenin's teaching on 'compromises' acquires great importance under contemporary conditions, when the Communists, particularly those in countries where many tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the winning of national independence have still to be performed, must be able to conclude alliances, not only with the peasantry, but also with some strata of the national bourgeoisie in the interests of the struggle against the foreign yoke. Here...one must not limp behind events, but one also must not run ahead and prematurely issue slogans of socialist transformation where conditions for it have not yet matured. (emphasis supplied)

Shevlyagin continued by pointing to the "left wing deviationist" demand of the Iraqi Communist party in the summer of 1959 for inclusion in the Iraqi government. He contended that the failure of this precipitous "left wing" demand should be "instructive" to other Communist parties of the East and Latin America "if they are faced with basically the same tasks." In short, Moscow was advising Communist parties in the backward areas not to be in a hurry either to enter the government or to seize power.

Regarding the Chinese desire for a more revolutionary strategy, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin, writing in Kommunist no. 6 on the Lenin anniversary, bluntly warned against those left-wing Communists who demanded the "stimulation" of the world revolution and who contended that the revolution could be brought about "only by war" or through armed struggle.

> (In 1918) Lenin waged a decisive battle with the so-called left Communists who were attempting to shove Soviet Russia into continuing the war with their arch-revolutionary

> phrases about 'the victory of the world revolution.' At that time Lenin formulated his well known position on the impossibility of nudging revolutions and of the inadmissability of interference in the affairs of other countries for importing revolution from without.
>
> Lenin wrote: 'It is supposed that the interests of the international revolution demand nudging of it, and that such nudging can be accomplished only by war, not by peace... Such 'theories' have nothing in common with Marxism, which always denied the nudging of revolutions--the sharpening of class contradictions leads to revolution.'
>
> So long as the two systems are antagonistic, there will be inevitable struggle between them--economic, political and ideological. This is the unbreakable law of social development. But from this it does not follow that the battle must lead to armed struggle. (emphasis supplied)

While Zorin may have slightly exaggerated the Chinese position on revolution, the Chinese polemicists themselves contended that the concept of violent revolution "lies at the root of Marx's and Engel's doctrine," that it was necessary to promote and to "support" such revolutions "without the slightest reservation," that the present epoch was "unprecedently favorable" for them, and that local wars could be salutary in bringing them about. The 1 April Red Flag wrote:

> ...the spearhead of US aggression at present is directed primarily against the colonial and semi-colonial states and independent countries. In order to realize world peace, the people of the whole world should support the national independence movement of the colonial and semi-colonial states, support the just struggles of the independent countries against imperialism, support just wars for national liberation and against imperialist aggression. (emphasis supplied)

Lu Ting-i said that the people of the whole world must "promote the development of revolution." And again:

> No force on earth can hinder or restrain the colonial and semi-colonial peoples from rising in revolution and smashing the yoke they are under.... All revolutionary Marxist-Leninists should support these just struggles resolutely and without the slightest reservation. Similarly, no force on earth can hinder or restrain the proletariat and working people in the capitalist countries from rising in revolution... All revolutionary Marxist-Leninists should likewise support these just struggles, resolutely and without the slightest reservation. (emphasis supplied)

In yet another passage he said:

> The Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists, starting from fundamentally different stands and viewpoints, draw fundamentally different conclusions on this situation. The Marxist-Leninists regard this as an unprecedentedly favorable new epoch for the proletarian revolution in the countries of the world and for the national revolution in the colonies and semi-colonies.

The Chinese strongly implied that local wars would be favorable for the bloc because they could be turned into revolutionary opportunities in which the local Communists could then seize power. The 25 April People's Daily recalled Lenin's warning after World War I that "propaganda for peace was damaging the prospects for protracted war being turned into revolution." Even more blatently, the 19 April Red Flag suggested that local wars which involved the use of bloc forces could be exploited to communize other countries.

> Since the armed forces of the socialist countries fight for justice, when these forces have to go beyond their borders to counter-attack a foreign enemy, it is only natural that they should exert an influence and have an effect wherever they go...

In short, the Chinese were understandably concerned that without war, the spread of Communism would be a difficult task. Communist power has in fact been established and extended largely as a direct result of two world wars. The

Chinese thus had good reason to be more pessimistic than Khrushchev about the prospects for spreading revolution during peacetime.

Inevitability or Noninevitability of War

At the 20th and 21st party congresses, Khrushchev had introduced important innovations into Leninist theory on the inevitability of war. At the 20th congress, he said that the present correlation of forces in the world indicated that "there is no fatalistic inevitability of wars," and that, although the danger of war existed, the opportunity and conditions had been established for "ensuring not merely a prolonged but a lasting peace." (emphasis in original) At the 21st congress, Khrushchev stated this thesis more sharply when he said that the new balance of forces in the world would engender a "real possibility of excluding world war from the life of society even before the complete triumph of socialism," and that "any attempt at aggression" would be stopped short--thus implying that local wars could be avoided as well.

In addition to these doctrinal innovations suggesting that the bloc had or would soon have sufficient power to deter the West from both general and local war, Soviet military and political leaders had for some time prior to spring 1960 been contending that local wars--given the nature of the opposed alliance systems and the nature of nuclear weapons--were bound to spread. While such statements were and are undoubtedly intended for psychological effect--i.e. as a means of deterring the West from local wars--they also probably reflect a genuine Soviet estimate that the West is in fact deterred from using force in any area of the world provided that local Communists do not attempt to seize power by force or the Communist powers do not initiate aggression. Kuusinen fortified this impression in his anniversary reply to the Chinese when he said that the "rapid stream" of historic progress was now flowing in a direction which would finally make "any war" impossible.

Perhaps the frankest statement of Soviet views on the question of local wars came in an article in International Affairs (no. 4, 1960) on the Lenin anniversary. The article was clearly intended as a reply to Chinese views on the subject.

The section on war began by contending flatly that the West was deterred from local as well as from global war. The balance of forces "exercises a restraining effect on the imperialist powers as regards so-called local wars." It then went on to show that since 1941, the frequency of local wars

had declined by about one-third as compared with past centuries. Moreover, not one of the local wars since 1945 "has brought a direct gain to the imperialist forces." Finally, although there were five local wars from 1945 to 1955, there had been only one--that in Algeria--since 1955. In this quantitative decline of local wars, the "decisive" factor was the might of the socialist system.

In sum, the Soviet argument was that local wars were becoming less and less unlikely because of the might of the bloc and that even in those cases where local wars had occurred the bloc had succeeded in preventing the West from improving its position.

Perhaps even more important, the article went on to warn in effect that the USSR would do all in its power to ensure that revolutions in various countries did not lead to civil wars in which the bloc might be forced into supporting one side while the West supported the other.

> In the atmosphere of rapid social development, characteristic of the present era, peaceful coexistence, while not retarding social changes in countries where these changes are ripe, must at the same time ensure a situation in which internal processes in particular countries do not lead to military clashes of the two antipodal systems. The situation is shaping favorably to such a course of events. (emphasis supplied)

In short, the USSR did not want to be committed to intervene in a "liberation" war in Africa or Asia or the Middle East in which there was a high probability that the West would intervene on the other side. Revolutionary gains must be made without great risk of civil war.

How was this to be done? In its very next paragraph, the article contended that

> this situation opens up new, unprecedented horizons before diplomacy. As methods of violence and diktat are relegated to the background, methods of negotiation assume even greater importance.

In plainer language, the USSR could make revolutionary gains via negotiations and without the risk of war.

Soviet views on the non-inevitability of war seem to be the result of several converging elements in their current strategic thinking. First, the Russians have exhibited both

in doctrine and in action a belief that the likely consequences of general war in the nuclear era are prohibitive. Second, they appear to believe they can attain their objectives in the middle run without the risk of general or local war. Third, Moscow's conservative thinking on war is intimately related to the present instability of the balance of terror. So long as neither side has an assured strike-second capability, both must live within the ever present danger of a deteriorating international situation which may at some point induce the other side to strike first, and perhaps decisively, by surprise. While such a fear on the Soviet side undoubtedly decreases as the Russians build up their missile capabilities, it is doubtful that they have yet reached a point where they can be assured of an invulnerable strike-second capability. Moreover, after both sides achieve an invulnerable strike-second capability, the Russians will probably be even less inclined than at present to take large risks of general war.

The first Red Flag article by Yu Chao-li on 1 April was almost entirely devoted to refuting Soviet positions on war. Its central thesis was twofold. First, it agreed with the Soviet view that the West was deterred from general war, and it went on to imply that the Russians were acting too timidly under the circumstances. Second, it held that while a two-camp war was unlikely, local wars were inevitable. It contended that the bloc should support those local revolutionary wars which were "just" and strongly oppose those imperialist-launched local wars which were "unjust."

It is not generally understood in the West that the essence of the Chinese position is not that general war is inevitable. The Chinese doctrinal articles, like those of the Russians, hold that such a war is possible. But they do not consider a general war in the near future as inevitable or even likely. This view is quite explicit in Mao's "smokescreen" line which was revived in the fall of 1958 and which occupies a central place in the Yu Chao-li article. According to Mao, the imperialist cliques were only "using the rumor that war between the USSR and the U.S. may break out at any moment as a smokescreen to hide their schemes to control the world...." The imperialists were said to be using the threat of a two-camp war in order to apply pressure on their own peoples and to expand into the "intermediate zone" between the U.S. and the USSR, e.g., the Middle East. The "real and direct contradictions" in the world since World War II, said Yu, "are not contradictions between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The Soviet Union and the United States can and are actually coexisting peacefully." In practical terms, therefore, Chinese doctrine holds that there is less danger of a two-camp war than does Soviet doctrine.

The second central element in the Chinese view, closely related to the first, is that while general war is unlikely, local wars are not only likely but inevitable. Because the "real and direct" contradictions in the world since World War II have been in fact not between the two camps but rather within the non-Communist world--that is, "the contradictions between the reactionary cliques of an imperialist country and its own people, the contradictions between the imperialist colonies and their colonies and semi-colonies, and the contradictions among the imperialist countries"--such contradictions will inevitably lead to civil wars in the capitalist countries, to wars between the capitalist countries and the colonial countries, and to wars among the imperialist countries.

Of those three kinds of inevitable wars, Yu seemed to believe that "colonial" wars are most probable. "The spearhead of U.S. aggression at present is directed primarily against the colonial and semi-colonial states and independent countries," he said. One of the "special features" since World War II had been the surging movement for national independence in colonial areas and the "continual suppression and use of force by imperialism to smother the movement." The imperialists could not voluntarily give up their plundering of the colonies and semi-colonies, because the very survival of imperialism depended on its obtaining raw material producing centers and markets. This being the case, "national liberation wars will remain inevitable."

Yu identified three different kinds of wars that had broken out between imperialism and the colonial areas, and he implied there would be more of the same in the future. These were 1) wars launched by imperialism to suppress actual colonies, 2) wars of aggression against countries which had achieved national independence, and 3) "national liberation wars" carried out in the form of a civil war to oppose imperialism and "its running dogs." All these kinds, he said, "are still being carried out both "separately and simultaneously." In sum, Yu considered both Western-initiated and bloc-sponsored or bloc-supported colonial wars as a continuing feature of the world.

The second type of local war which Yu seemed to consider most likely was civil war in a capitalist country. Quoting Lenin, and with an eye cocked at Khrushchev's thesis on the possibility of peaceful takeover of power, Yu said:

> Civil wars are also wars. Whoever recognizes the class struggle cannot fail to recognize civil wars which in every class of society

> constitute the natural, and under certain conditions, inevitable continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle. All the great revolutions prove this. To repudiate civil war, or to forget about it, would mean sinking into extreme opportunism and renouncing the socialist revolution.

Finally, Yu--in good Leninist fashion--contended that there were irreconcilable contradictions between the imperialist countries who were struggling for markets and raw materials that would lead to war. Both World War I and World War II, he contended, had begun as war among the imperialist countries and there could be no guarantee that World War III would not begin the same way.

> Who can guarantee that West Germany and Japan will not tread their old path? Again, who can guarantee that West Germany will not launch a new war of aggression in the West and Japan will not launch a new war of aggression in Southeast Asia? Furthermore, who can guarantee that there will not be a recurrence of the Pearl Harbor incident, or that there will not be a new world war among the imperialist countries?

The Chinese views on the inevitability of local wars were stated even more succinctly and more revealingly by central committee member Liu Chang Sheng on 8 June in his speech to the WFTU meeting in Peiping. Liu specified four types of inevitable local wars: imperialist wars of suppression against the colonial countries, imperialist wars of suppression against the people in their own countries, national liberation wars in the colonies, and peoples' revolutionary wars in the capitalist countries. The first two kinds of local wars were "unjust," said Liu, and the second two were "just." It was the bloc duty, he said, to uphold just wars and to oppose unjust wars. It was "entirely wrong" to believe that such local wars could be avoided and it was also wrong to talk indiscriminantly (as the Russians did) about opposing war in general without "making a specific analysis of its nature."

In short, the Chinese do not believe--as the Russians evidently do--that the West is deterred from local as well as from general war. The Chinese therefore estimate that the bloc will have to continue to use force against the West whenever the West initiates local war. Moreover, the Chinese believe that local or civil wars--either of the bloc's own making or those it can exploit to its own ends--are inevitable and should be fully supported. While the Russians have not disavowed "just" wars or aid and support to those fighting "just" wars, their present emphasis is on the possibility of eliminating

all wars--by implication, both "just" and "unjust." Their lack of material support for the Algerian rebels is indicative that they do not believe their interests are presently served as much by stirring the colonial fires as by pursuing their diplomatic objectives with the colonial powers.

Another reason for the difference in the Russian and Chinese approach to local wars is that the Russians want a detente which they believe they can employ to spread their influence and power and they are aware that they cannot have a detente and support local wars at the same time. The Chinese are not interested in a detente, believing as they do that such a detente will harm both world Communism and their own interests, and therefore are interested in stirring up local wars, particularly in the colonial areas in which they can spread their own influence.

In sum, the Chinese Communist Lenin anniversary attack on Soviet ideology and the revolutionary strategy reflected in that ideology in effect accused the Russians of "revising, emasculating and betraying" Marxism-Leninism. Such an attack could not but have the effect of calling into question Khrushchev's leadership of the Communist movement. The three principal targets of the Chinese fire were the very three basic ideological innovations which Khrushchev personally had presented to the 20th party congress. They rejected Khrushchev's views on the possibility and advisability of seeking a long range detente with the West and contended that coexistence could mean only an armed truce; they contended that although general war could be avoided by persistent and defiant revolutionary struggle and a policy of strength, local wars were inevitable so long as imperialism remained and that it was the bloc duty to foster and support "just" wars; and they minimized the possibility of peaceful accession to power in the non-Communist world and contended that those who emphasized on such possibilities were traitors to the cause.

IV. THE "COLONIAL LIBERATION" STRUGGLE

It has been suggested throughout this series that the question of strategy toward the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America--the "colonial and semi-colonial" areas, or, in Peiping's view, the "East"--is highly important in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The Question of Soviet Aid

Central to Soviet strategy in these areas is the increasing use of aid and trade designed to alienate the underdeveloped countries from Western markets and from Western political influence, and thus to promote neutralism by making these countries less politically and economically dependent upon the West. Moscow evidently envisages expanding its aid to the uncommitted countries as its own gross national product rises during the course of the Soviet Seven Year Plan and beyond.

As the eminent British economist Alec Nove has pointed out

> on a long-term view, the building up of the internal economic might of the bloc may be the decisive factor (in winning the East-West struggle). On the available evidence, this is the view of the Soviet leaders... Khrushchev evidently believes that the uncommitted countries must naturally gravitate toward the Soviet way when the USSR and its allies are capable of out-producing the Western world, and are more efficient than America. It is also evident that an economically mighty bloc will be far better equipped to supply the needs of the underdeveloped world, to outbid the West, and to disorganize the 'capitalist' markets at will. (emphasis supplied)

(For Nove's discussion of this Soviet economic strategy and the serious long-term threat it poses to the Western position in the uncommitted countries, see his "Communist Economic Strategy: Soviet Growth and Capabilities," 1959.)

For a variety of reasons, the Chinese Communists apparently oppose this Soviet economic strategy or at least the scale on which it is given and the priority it occupies in Soviet strategic thinking. They may believe that Khrushchev's aid will only strengthen non-Communist governments and inhibit rather than facilitate the ultimate "socialist revolution." It has been shown that Chinese doctrinal statements in the fall

of 1959 seemed to cast doubt on the wisdom of Soviet aid to the underdeveloped countries on the grounds that the nationalist governments could not be trusted to continue "independent" foreign policies or to pursue genuine industrialization programs or to raise the standards of living in their own countries. Peiping held up the specter of these nationalist regimes gravitating back into the Western camp unless they were replaced in the near future by Communist or Communist-front governments. Peiping may also understandably believe that the underdeveloped bloc countries--including China--should have priority on Soviet capital. Finally, Peiping may also believe that Soviet aid programs might facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence in these areas but will not facilitate the expansion of Chinese influence.

Several developments in the spring of 1960 tended to confirm Peiping's growing concern over Soviet economic policy toward the uncommitted countries. Perhaps the most significant was the provocative and impertinent question put to Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan in Iraq by an NCNA correspondent. The correspondent, during an interview of Mikoyan by Iraqi and foreign newsmen on 15 April, bluntly asked the Soviet leader

> What is the Soviet position on the question of developing the national economy of the Afro-Asian countries, and how does it differ from the Western position on this question?

That Mikoyan took this question as a provocation is evident from his reply which is worth quoting at length.

> I can assure the NCNA representative that our position on this question is just as favorable for the Afro-Asian peoples who are building their national economy as the position of the CPR Government. We do not regard these countries as raw material appendages of industrially developed countries, as spheres of influence or capital investment.
>
> We are trading with these countries on mutually advantageous terms. We are not foisting our goods on them to the detriment of their national industries. Far from obstructing, we are doing our best to assist in the industrial advance of the economically underdeveloped countries....
>
> We help those countries not to draw them into blocs as the imperialist powers do; we do not attach any political strings to our assistance. We respect the sovereignty of those countries, and we help strengthen it. (emphasis supplied)

Further discord between Moscow and Peiping over the question of economic policy toward the uncommitted countries was manifest at the Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Conakry in early April. The Indian secretary on the permanent secretariat of the conference reported that there had been a clash between Moscow and Peiping over the formulation of the economic resolution agreed to at the conference. The Chinese wanted to delete a passage which said that Afro-Asian development could be facilitated "the sooner the cold war is ended and international tension is reduced." Peiping contended, according to the report, that such a reference would "create illusions among Afro-Asian countries that the imperialists want our economic development and seriously believe in disarmament and world peace." The Chinese attitude reportedly shocked both the Soviet delegate and some observers from the Communist-front organization, the World Peace Council. Moscow, for its part, must have been very pleased with the wording of the resolution because it had been contending for some time precisely that the funds saved from disarmament could be used to aid the economic development of the uncommitted countries.

Further evidence of Peiping's opposition to the Soviet aid program was reflected in the differing Sino-Soviet approaches to the Afro-Asian economic conference in Cairo in early May. A Moscow radio commentary, broadcast to Africa on 4 May, stressed that most of the newly liberated countries needed to free themselves from economic dependence on foreign monopolies and that, in order to accomplish that goal, they could "rely" on Soviet aid.

> Relying on this (Soviet) aid, economically backward countries can develop their economies more quickly and create those branches of industry which they need.

The Chinese delegate to the conference, Nan Han-Chen, stressed quite to the contrary that the newly developing countries must "rely on their own efforts." Although he drew a distinction between disinterested Soviet aid and that of the West, the burden of his remarks constituted a warning against aid from anywhere, a plea for self-reliance and intra-African and Asian cooperation, and a reminder that Chinese history demonstrated conclusively that foreign aid was not essential to industrialization and economic development. After warning that any country which "relied" on so-called "imperialist aid" would inevitably be forced to surrender national sovereignty, the Chinese delegate said:

> We advocate that the Asian and African countries be economically independent and rely on their own efforts, and that we cooperate, aid each other, and develop our trade relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In this respect, the experience of the Chinese people affords powerful proof. In old China, we had to import every year large quantities of wheat and rice from abroad. But today, 10 years after liberation, our grain output has more than doubled.

In short, China achieved rapid economic development without a great deal of aid and there was no reason why the newly developing countries could not imitate her.

The same point was made in the 13 July 1960 issue of the Chinese journal "Research on International Problems," The Chinese People's Republic, the article affirmed, was economically weaker than "certain newly risen Asian countries which have just won their national independence." Yet the Chinese people, in building up its national economy, "mainly relied on their own strength."

Perhaps the most direct indication of Chinese reservations about Soviet aid programs came in Kuusinen's Lenin anniversary reply to Chinese attacks on Soviet global strategy.

Kuusinen made a strong defense of the Soviet aid policy to the uncommitted countries in polemical terms which left the clear impression that the Chinese opposed such aid. He pointedly contrasted Soviet economic obligations to the bloc with its "wider understanding of (its) international duty" which included the extending of aid to "any liberated people" even if they were not "members of the world socialist system."

> People who for centuries bore on their shoulders the yoke of colonialist exploitation now need not only moral and political support, but also economic aid for development of their national economies.
>
> As for our relations with countries which joined the socialist camp--the CPR, the SPRK, the DRV, and the Mongolian People's Republic--these relations were determined from the very outset by the principles of socialist internationalism. Close alliance, brotherly friendship, mutual aid, and cooperation in construction of socialism and Communism--such is the basis of these relations.

> However, we have a wider understanding of the international duty of our socialist country. We understand that duty to include extending aid to any liberated people even if they are not members of the world socialist system....
>
> The road to consolidation of the independence of liberated countries is the road of developing their national economy, advancing their culture, and improving the living standards of their people. Industrialization is of enormous importance for such countries. It is in this matter that young states need support most.

This line of argument ran directly contrary to the line the Chinese had taken in October 1959--that so long as these young countries were led by bourgeois nationalists, they could not hope to industrialize, to improve the living standards of their people or to make much progress towards economic independence from the West.

In the June issue of the Soviet monthly International Affairs, Moscow again issued a lengthy defense of its aid policy under the title "Soviet Aid--and its 'Critics.'" Although the "critics" were identified only as Westerners, it was evident that Moscow had some non-Western critics in mind as well. For example, the author took pains to refute the argument that Soviet assistance to former colonies robs it of the opportunity to "export revolution" and was therefore contrary to Marxist doctrine, hardly a line to be taken to a Western audience. The author also pointed out that the struggle in the underdeveloped countries "will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie" but would instead by a struggle of all the oppressed countries against international imperialism--and this was the reason why the Soviet government was "giving economic and technical assistance to the former colonies on an inter-governmental basis rendering it to nations, and not to some classes within them." (emphasis supplied) The counter argument, implicit in this statement, was that Soviet aid should be confined to revolutionary movements. The article went on the quote Khrushchev that Soviet assistance to underdeveloped countries would increase as the Seven Year Plan developed and it in fact promised that a specific part of Soviet resources would be systematically set aside for this purpose.

Support of "Liberation" Movements

Since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Communists have been faced with a chronic dilemma in their dealings with nationalist independence movements in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Should they ally themselves with

nationalist parties in these areas seeking genuine independence? If so, would they not then be incurring the risk that these nationalist allies would turn on them once they became strong enough or once they achieved power? What should be the role of the Soviet Union toward support of these nationalist independence movements? Should it actively encourage and support all such nationalist revolutionary movements or would this interfere with Soviet diplomatic goals in the Western world?

The dilemma is as old as the Second Comintern Congress of 1920 when Lenin and the Indian Communist M.N. Roy--in the first major discussion of the problem--differed over these and related questions. In Lenin's report to the Comintern,* he told the assembled delegates that "we (in the committee) fought over the question as to whether it is proper theoretically and on principle to declare that the Communist International and the Communist Parties are bound to support the bourgeois democratic movements in the backward countries." The solution reached was that "we should not deal with bourgeois democratic movements but with revolutionary nationalist movements." The Communists, said Lenin, should support liberation movements only "in cases when these movements are really revolutionary." If they were not, the Communists were "obliged to fight against the reformist bourgeoisie in those countries."

Roy did not publicly disagree with Lenin but it was apparent that he wished the adoption of a harder line than Lenin toward the nationalist bourgeoisie in the colonial areas. Roy stressed that the Comintern should not seek to deal with bourgeois nationalist movements in the colonial areas but rather only with the most revolutionary parties and groups. Most important, he contended that even though the colonial revolution in its early stages would not be a Communist revolution, the revolution should be "in the hands of a Communist vanguard." He warned that the leadership of the revolution should not be surrendered to the bourgeois democrats.

Roy's view that the Communists should not abandon leadership of the colonial revolution to the nationalists even in the early stages of the revolution was incorporated in Mao's writings in 1939-40, the period in which he wrote "On New Democracy." Mao's writings in this period suggested, first, that the "new democratic revolution" then developing in China

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* See the Second Congress of the Communist International Publishing Office of the Communist International, America, 1920.

would develop much the same way in all colonial and semi-colonial countries; and, second, that in the early stages of this "new democratic revolution" there would have to be a joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. Mao was at great pains to distinguish this new transitional dictatorship both from past democratic revolutions in Western countries and from the socialist revolution that had occurred in the USSR. Politically, it meant in short that the Communist parties in all underdeveloped countries should strive for participation in a government composed of all revolutionary groups. This would guarantee that even if the Communists could not take power by themselves early in the revolution, they would not be submerged in a nationalist regime. As Mao wrote in an essay on "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," in December 1939:

> This kind of revolution is developing in China as well as in all colonial and semi-colonial countries, and we call it the new democratic revolution. This new democratic revolution...politically...means the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the imperialists, collaborators and reactionaries and opposition to the transformation of Chinese society into a society under bourgeois dictatorship. Economically, it means nationalization of all big capital and big enterprises of the imperialists, collaborators and reactionaries, distribution of the land of the landlords among the peasants, and at the same time the general preservation of private capitalist enterprises without the elimination of rich-peasant economy... This kind of new-democratic revolution differs greatly from the democratic revolutions in the history of European and American countries, in that it results not in the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie but in the dictatorship of the united front of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat... This kind of new-democratic revolution differs also from a socialist revolution in that it aims only at overthrowing the rule of the imperialists, collaborators and reactionaries in China, but not at injuring any capitalist sections which can still take part in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggles.

The Maoist claim to have discovered a new type of transitional government valid for all colonial and semi-colonial countries in the period between the democratic and the socialist revolutions was stated even more bluntly in Mao's "On New

Democracy" in January 1940. In that work, he identified three types of state systems in the world, classified according to the class character of their political power. These three systems were 1) republics under bourgeois dictatorship; 2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and 3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. The third kind of government, said Mao

> is the transitional form of state to be adopted by revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries. To be sure, revolutions in different colonial and semi-colonial countries necessarily have certain different characteristics, but these constitute only minor differences within a general framework of uniformity.

Mao's writings in this period thus laid the groundwork for the claims to be advanced by the Chinese Communists almost immediately after they took power that China, and by implication not the USSR, was the model for revolution in the underdeveloped countries. Implicit in Mao's analysis was a belief that the underdeveloped countries--for a variety of reasons--could not move directly from the bourgeois to the socialist stage of the revolution and that there would be a transitional period in which Communist parties in these areas would have to share power with nationalists and other parties of the left. An important consideration was probably the realization that most of the underdeveloped countries lacked the resources and level of industrialization to be transferred overnight into "socialist" states. Most important--in terms of strategy--was the Maoist reiteration, in effect, of Roy's thesis that local Communist parties could not allow the nationalist parties in the underdeveloped countries to lead the "new democratic" revolution.

The Sino-Soviet debate over strategy for the colonial liberation movement in large part revolves about this chronic dilemma of collaboration with the nationalist bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries. As a Soviet writer was to point out in August 1960, "at the beginning of any national movement the bourgeoisie assumes the role of hegemony" and there was no reason why there could not be a "lengthy cooperation" between the Communists and part of the national bourgeoisie. In sum, the Russians were prepared for the time being to allow local Communists to play second fiddle to nationalist movements in the colonial areas even nationalist governments such as those in India, Indonesia, the UAR and elsewhere were harsh in their treatment of local Communists. To the Chinese, such a policy of prolonged cooperation with

the national bourgeoisie meant an indefinite deferral of the revolution in these countries. It was essential for local Communist parties to seek right from the outset of any national independence movement to gain control of that movement. Failing that, it was necessary to exercise continuing pressure on the nationalist leadership of the independence movement to force it to bring local Communists into the government or to form governments that would either be pro-Communist or more easily manipulated by the Communists.

The importance attached by the Chinese to the question of the leading role for the Communists in any colonial independence movement was stated in a 3 January 1960 article in International Study which sought to explain why the Cuban revolution was such a "good example" of national democratic revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was so because the revolution first established its bases in rural areas, then surrounded the cities by revolutionary forces in the villages, and finally seized the cities and political power. Second, the Cuban worker-peasant movement was under the leadership and influence of the Cuban Communist Party. It was for this reason, the article continues, that the "strong Communist leadership" in the Cuban revolution movement was able to promote the "correct 'united-front' policy." Third, the Cuban revolution was dominated by "progressive" elements of the bourgeoisie--i.e. was dominated by elements who could be counted on to pursue the revolution and not to take hostile action against the local Communists.

In sum, the Chinese strategy for the colonial and semi-colonial areas insists that local Communists can pursue "united front" tactics but only if they occupy a prominent role in the leadership of the united front and only if they are reasonably certain that their nationalist allies will not turn on them once the "democratic" revolution is successful. If the Communists do not occupy such a leading position, warn the Chinese, the result will be future calamities such as occurred in Egypt, Iraq, India and Indonesia--i.e. nationalist parties will take power and be free to take action against the Communists. The correct united front, in short, is one similar to that pursued by the Communists in Czechoslovakia from 1945-48, and not the one now being pursued, for example, by the Iraqi Communists.

In May 1960, two important articles in the Chinese Communist press spelled out once again the Chinese views on strategy toward the bourgeois nationalist governments and independence movements in the underdeveloped countries. The first was an article in China Youth no. 9, 1 May. The article began by noting that in the 15 years since the end of World War II, "colonial and semi-colonial" countries having a total

population of some 1400 millions had achieved independence. It wondered in what direction these countries would develop and what would be their relation to the socialist stages. To find the answers to these questions "of great importance in today's world," it noted that it was necessary to study Chairman Mao's theories on China's new democratic revolution, "particularly those dealing with the roles of the Chinese proletarian class and bourgeois class in the national democratic revolution." Because these Maoist theories were developed from revolutionary experience in a "typical" colonial and semi-colonial country, namely China, "they are applicable to other colonial and semi-colonial countries." In fact, it was now claimed, Mao's theories "represent a new development and rediscovery of the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries."

The author then went on to identify three different types of national democratic movements in the colonial countries since World War II. There were some countries such as China in which a complete victory of the new democratic revolution had been won, thus completing the change from the first to the second stage of the revolution, that is, the building of socialism. This new situation was "possible only because the (Chinese) revolution was conducted under the leadership of the proletarian class and guided by the general theory of new democratic revolution of Chairman Mao"--the implication being that all other colonial revolutions would also have to be guided by Maoist theory. A second type of colonial country was that which had declared independence but which was still ruled by the upper bourgeois class and therefore had no real independence. In these countries, such as the Philippines and Malaya, the revolution had been stolen by the upper bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie had surrendered to the former. Finally, there were many countries somewhere between the first and second types in which--although the upper bourgeoisie was not in control--nevertheless the proletariat had not assumed leadership of the revolution. Although the author did not specify, he clearly meant such countries as the UAR, India, Iraq, and Indonesia. In these countries, the national bourgeoisie had adopted various measures to weaken imperialist control and native feudal exploitation; moreover, being separated from the original colonial system, they "must be considered politically independent and nationalist states." However, the author pointed out, "these countries have not severed and dare not sever their relations with imperialism. They always let the imperialists retain varying degrees of political interests, and almost without exception, allow the imperialists to retain their economic interests and welcome their investments." Moreover, with respect to domestic policies, the national bourgeoisie of these countries "dare not

and cannot completely abolish native feudalism." In the process of economic development, they put the economic burdens of the people and enriched the monopolist bourgeois class. All this

> indicates nothing other than the reactionary and compromising nature of the national bourgeois class in a colonial and semi-colonial country. It also fully proves the scientific conclusion of Chairman Mao contending that the national bourgeois class in a colonial and semi-colonial country cannot be depended upon for the complete overthrow of the imperialist and feudal forces in the new democratic revolution.

Furthermore, continued the author, the danger was great that the present national bourgeois governments in many of these countries might be replaced by a dictatorship of the upper bourgeois class, a development which could set back the newly independent country to the status of a temporary semi-colony.

Free from Communist jargon, the political significance of this line of reasoning was the reiteration of the Chinese view, first enunciated in the fall of 1959 (see Chapter VI, ESAU X), that the nationalist governments in most of the underdeveloped and so-called uncommitted countries were not worthy of Communist support because of their reactionary nature and would have to be brought down in favor of more "progressive" governments if the "new democratic revolution" were ultimately to be brought about.

The tactics advocated by the above author to restrain the reactionary trend of the national bourgeoisie was that of a united front in which the proletariat (i.e. the Communists) would preserve its independence and freedom of action. The Communists should support that segment of the bourgeois class still opposed to imperialism but should struggle against the compromising segment. At the same time, the proletariat should gradually gain strength and "take over the leadership of the revolution."

In short, the Chinese were not calling for immediate and direct revolutionary attempts against these governments but rather for an increase in pressure on those sections of the ruling groups which were not sympathetic to the Communists' minimum demands, an alliance with those groups which were sympathetic to those demands, a gradual buildup of Communist strength, and finally an attempt to replace the present governments with governments either pro-Communist or more amenable to Communist desires.

The article left the clear impression that Chinese thinking on colonial strategy was still more revolutionary and uncompromising than Soviet thinking. While the Chinese were still talking about the need to bring down most of the nationalist governments in the colonial areas, an authoritative Soviet spokesman several months later would flatly state that the Communists could and should enter into a period of prolonged cooperation with these nationalist governments.

Still another important Chinese Communist assessment of the strategic situation in the colonial and semi-colonial areas appeared in Studies in International Affairs no. 5, of 3 May 1960. Of particular interest was the article's insistence on the almost inevitable need for national liberation wars which would be supported by the socialist camp. The article contended that there had never been any colonial or semi-colonial people who achieved independence "without sacrificing thousands of their revolutionary comrades." This was so because

> in the face of the powerful and fierce imperialists and colonial powers, national liberation war is necessarily an extremely important means by which the peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial areas may achieve the ultimate victory of their national liberation struggle.

Moreover, the article implicitly berated the Russians for their failure to endorse more enthusiastically the need for such liberation wars. It did this by calling attention to the fact that Lenin himself had "never made a general denunciation of war" (as had Khrushchev). Lenin, to the contrary, said the author, had declared in "no uncertain terms" that "our Party may be sympathetic to such wars or insurrections." In the choice of his quotation from Lenin, the Chinese author went so far as to implicitly accuse the Russians of "pacifism."

> To pay lip service to internationalism but to substitute the vulgar nationalism and pacifism for internationalism in their propaganda, agitation and actual work is a most common phenomenon...even in those political parties that profess to be ideologically Communist...

To the Russian contention that civil wars and armed violence in the colonial areas would lead to hostilities with the West, the Chinese retorted that this was not so, that

active support of these liberation movements would strengthen peace. This was so because colonial unrest would weaken the forces of imperialism and therefore weaken their capabilities for war.

> To support the oppressed peoples in the armed struggle against imperialism is an integral part of our struggle for peace. This has been true in the light of facts. During the ten-odd years since the war, the rising tide of the struggle against imperialism and for national liberation as has been waged by the peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial areas, has seriously weakened the imperialists' capabilities for war and aggression and disturbed their plans for war, thereby contributing most significantly to the defense of world peace. It follows, therefore, that by rendering active assistance to the national liberation movements, the world proletariat and the socialist states significantly contribute to to the defense of world peace. Whoever is genuinely struggling for world peace cannot but link the national liberation movements with the world-wide movement in search of peace and regard it his proper duty to render assistance to the national liberation movements in the colonial and semi-colonial areas. To deny this would not only mean the violation of Lenin's principles of proletarian internationalism, but also may weaken the forces in defense of world peace.

In sum, Khrushchev's strategy of caution in the colonial areas was not only a violation of "proletarian internationalism"--i.e. failure to support all revolutionary movements against imperialism--but it would indirectly strengthen the hand of the imperialists by failing to exploit golden opportunities to weaken them.

The Case of Algeria

The differences between Moscow and Peiping over policy toward the "colonial liberation" movement are nowhere better illustrated than in their respective attitudes toward the Algerian rebellion. For all Communists, the Algerian rebellion is the classical form of the "just" colonial war--a war initiated by a colonial people in order to win independence from an oppressive colonial power. If Leninist dogma were the only criterion of Communist policy, the only

possible course of action would be to recognize the Algerian revolutionary government immediately and to aid it with all possible means.

The Algerian rebellion has never presented any dilemmas to the Chinese Communists. They recognized the FLN immediately after it formed a government in exile in 1958. They have consistently urged a continuation of the liberation war, hoping both that this war would be an example to other oppressed African peoples and that it would exacerbate political tensions within metropolitan France to a point where a revolutionary opportunity might present itself there. Moreover, colonial wars, such as the Algerian, present the Chinese with unique opportunities to expand their prestige and influence. They calculate that, because the United States will not dare cross its French allies and aid the nationalist rebellion, the Algerian nationalists will be increasingly driven to look for support in the Communist camp. For these reasons, the Chinese Communists have never looked with favor on the prospects of a negotiated settlement between the French and the Algerian rebels. For such a negotiated settlement could cut the ground from under their contention that the colonial powers will not withdraw peacefully from the colonies, and that, even when they do, it is only a form of deception designed to maintain more subtle economic influence.

For the Russians, the Algerian rebellion has been the source of a dilemma. Although they are no less eager than the Chinese to spread colonial unrest and revolution, they must balance this goal against their equally important middle range goal of splitting the French away from the Western alliance. It is for this reason that the Soviet Union has never extended formal recognition to the Algerian rebel government and only recently, in the wake of the summit collapse and the increasing Chinese rivalry in the colonial areas, has extended de facto recognition to the rebels.

The argument between Peiping and Moscow over Algeria--prior to the summit collapse, was an argument over sectional priorities within the common goal of expanding Communist power and influence. Because the Chinese had no relations with the French, had little to gain from wooing the French, and were pessimistic over the possibility of breaking France away from the United States, they wanted bloc strategy to be concentrated on giving unequivocal support to the Algerian rebels and to any other nationalist revolutionary movements in the colonial areas. The Russians, on the other hand, had diplomatic relations with the French, they believed

they had much to gain from improving those relations, and they were confident that they could increase the strains between France, the United States and France's other Western allies.

The differences between Moscow and Peiping over Algeria were already smoldering even before 31 October 1959 when Khrushchev suddenly took an important step toward the French position. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev suddenly reversed the previous Soviet position of hostility to DeGaulle's 16 September proposals for a cease-fire in Algeria. The new Soviet position was that DeGaulle's proposals for self-determination, if supported by real steps, "could play an important role in the settlement of the Algerian question." Within this context, Moscow also began to take a hopeful view of possible French-FLN negotiations that would bring the war to an end. The Soviet reversal was quickly, if embarrassingly, initiated by the French Communist party which had only a month earlier denounced DeGaulle's proposals as a stall.

The reasons why Khrushchev suddenly made his tactical switch on Algeria seems clear. On the eve of his meeting with the French President, scheduled for April, and prior to the summit meeting, Khrushchev was evidently prepared to go far toward showing good will to the French. Khrushchev's switch came 10 days after a French Cabinet statement which in effect called for Soviet deeds to substantiate Moscow's alleged interest in detente.

It might be objected that Khrushchev's verbal switch did not involve a change in Soviet policy. Yet Khrushchev's words represented a significant political act. Unless one assumes that the Russians covertly informed the FLN leaders not to pay any attention to those words, they must have exerted considerable psychological impact on the FLN which has consistently threatened to move closer to the Communists if the French did not grant immediate independence. Khrushchev's statement must have undermined the position of FLN extremists who wanted to continue the war, or who at least, wanted to set a high price on a cease-fire.

Moreover, the possibility certainly cannot be dismissed that, at the time, Khrushchev was prepared to support a cease-fire in Algeria. He may have calculated that negotiations leading to a cease-fire were inevitable in any case and that he might as well seek to reap the maximum political advantage from them. At a minimum, his Supreme Soviet speech served notice that he was not prepared to do anything to prevent such negotiations.

The Chinese Communists clearly regarded Khrushchev's tactics as ill-advised at best and disastrous at worst. They made no comment whatever on any portion of Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech, few portions of which could have appealed to them. They did not follow Moscow or the French party in publicly reversing their hostile attitude toward DeGaulle's proposals. A commentary on 12 November explicitly contradicted the spirit of Khrushchev's statement by denouncing DeGaulle's proposals as "nothing but a trick from A to Z." In the months to follow, Peiping continued to indicate its opposition to a negotiated settlement of the Algerian rebellion, encouraged the Algerian rebels to fight through to final victory, and denounced the French proposals as a political maneuver. Thus, on 12 November 1959, Peiping radio said that, provided the Algerian people "carry on their struggle," they will certainly gain "final victory." On 23 November, Peiping broadcast a statement from an Algerian leader who said flatly that "the Algerian war will continue with greater intensity from now on until independence is achieved." On 1 December, in celebrating "Imperialists, Quit Africa Day," Peiping referred to French political deceptions and intrigues and said that the Algerian national liberation army was "growing mightier in battle and winning one victory after another." The FLN, it said, would "uphold their struggle until they won true independence" (emphasis supplied).

The differences between Soviet and Chinese statements on Algerian policy persisted right up to the eve of the abortive summit conference in May. A 3 March address by DeGaulle on Algerian policy--not attacked by Moscow--was roundly attacked by Peiping as the statement of an "imperialist" and "reactionary."

Why did the Chinese Communists manifest such hostility toward Khrushchev's tactics?

They clearly calculated that a continuation of the Algerian war would suit both the interests of the bloc and their own interests far more than a negotiated settlement. The problem was that the Algerian rebels might decide to accept French terms, a contingency which, the Chinese reportedly admitted to the rebel leaders, was a cause of considerable concern. Because the Chinese were so vitally interested in keeping the war hot, they must have regarded Khrushchev's support for DeGaulle's proposals as akin to treason to the revolution.

In the final analysis, Peiping regards itself, and not Moscow as the leader of the anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa. It consequently must view with utmost dislike

what it regards as opportunistic Soviet overtures to the colonial powers tending to impede nationalist revolution in those areas, particularly when such Soviet overtures are calculated to make gains for the Russians but not for the Chinese.

By early April, the Soviet and Chinese views on the colonial struggle had reached such an impasse that a Chinese Communist diplomat [redacted] suggested that, because of Khrushchev's lack of support to colonial revolutionary movements, it has become "China's task" to support the anti-imperialist forces. The Chinese official complained that Khrushchev's visits to capitalistic nations like France could not benefit the socialist camp. Khrushchev, he complained, was not a revolutionary leader like Stalin and he was trying to do things contrary to the revolutionary ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

The Chinese Communists looked with disfavor on a negotiated settlement in Algeria not only because they hoped to draw the Algerian rebels closer to themselves but, perhaps equally important, because continuation of the war would serve as a vivid illustration of their point that no colonial people could free itself finally and irrevocably without an armed fight. Algeria, in short, was a classroom in insurrection that the Chinese hoped would spread throughout the remaining colonial territories in Africa and to the semi-colonial countries in Latin America and Asia. Thus, a Red Flag article in mid-March referred to the Algerian example and also to the "massive armed resistance" in the Congo, Nyasaland, Ruanda-Urundi and Uganda. The African people, said Red Flag, cannot be deceived; they know that "there has not been a single case in history in which the colonialists withdrew from the colonies of their own accord, nor will such a thing ever happen in the future." It summed up its belief in the Algerian example succinctly: "This course (war for national liberation) persisted in by the Algerian people is of vital significance to the African national liberation movement as a whole."

A similar line was taken in a People's Daily article of 20 March in the struggle in Latin America. What was "especially elating," the party newspaper wrote, was that Castro's triumph in Cuba caused the entire situation in Latin America to undergo a "great change." Why was this so? Because Cuba was the first country in Latin America to "employ armed struggle to overthrow a dictatorial government and the control of the United States." The Cuban revolution, like the Algerian war in African eyes, was said to be a "shining example" for Latin America.

On 29 March, Peiping declared a special "Algeria Day" marked by considerable propaganda on Chinese support for the Algerian cause. The statement issued by the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity* noted that China's Algerian "brothers are now at the forefront of the struggle against imperialism and colonialism," affirmed that the Algerians had set a "brilliant example" for other African peoples, and continued to label DeGaulle's proposals to negotiate as an "intrigue" really intended to continue military action.

One of the principal Soviet dilemmas in handling the Algerian problem has been the danger that China, by adopting an irreconcilably anti-French stand, in sharp contrast to Moscow's middle-of-the-road stance, would be able to increase its own influence with the Algerian rebels, and ultimately with the independent Algerian government, at the expense of the Russians. The growing Soviet concern over this possibility was evidenced in Mikoyan's 18 April press conference in Baghdad. Early in this interview, Mikoyan had sternly replied to an obviously provocative question by the NCNA correspondent on the sensitive question of Soviet aid to the Afro-Asian countries. The Chinese correspondent had asked how the Soviet position on this question differed from the Western position. The very question was an obvious criticism of the Soviet position on aid and Mikoyan replied to it in kind. He said sarcastically that he "could assure" the NCNA correspondent that the Soviet position on the question was "just as favorable" for the Afro-Asian peoples as the position of the Chinese government. Rejecting the invidious comparison implicit in the correspondent's question, he denied that the Soviet Union "regards those countries as raw material appendages of industrially developed countries, as spheres of influence or capital investment." In short, Moscow was not playing the old imperialist game, however suspicious Peiping might be.

It was in this context that Mikoyan then replied to a question put to him by the Iraq News Agency correspondent on the Soviet position on Algeria. The correspondent wanted to know why, if the Soviet Union was the stanchest defender of the Algerian people's rights, it had not recognized the Algerian Government, "although there are countries which have done so?" The correspondent clearly had Peiping in mind. Whether the Chinese had put him up to this embarrassing question or whether it was simply a case of the Iraqi correspondent playing the Chinese off against the Russians, Mikoyan quickly responded to the spirit of the question and replied that:

* NCNA, 29 March 1960.

> We are giving the greatest possible support to Algeria, even more so than do some of the countries which have recognized the Algerian Government. (emphasis supplied)

In response to the very next question as to whether the USSR would send volunteers to fight in Algeria, Mikoyan replied sharply:

> Do you understand what this would mean? When you think about it, you will understand that you asked this question to no purpose. Some people who heard your question will hasten to declare that the Bolsheviks want to occupy Algeria by volunteers and make it its colony (laughter and animation).

The mounting interest demonstrated by Peiping in the Algerian war was once again illustrated by the extensive publicity given an Algerian rebel delegation which visited China from 30 April to 20 May. It seemed apparent that the Algerians came to Peiping in the hopes of receiving commitments for military and financial aid. On 24 May, following the delegation's return to Cairo, NCNA reported the leader of the delegation, Vice Premier Krim Balkacem, as having noted that China was "willing to support the Algerian revolution in its struggle against imperialism with all means." An NCNA review (28 May) of a 12 May article in the FLN organ Al-Mujahid quoted the paper as stating that "the assistance from the great socialist country (the CPR) is valuable and can contribute to the Algerian revolution in the military and financial spheres." Several newspaper reports from Paris quoted sources there to the effect that the Chinese had prepared to supply immediately 1000 technicians who would give instructions to FLN fighters on how to handle new Chinese weapons and that the Chinese had solved the technical problem of delivering arms and other supplies. (See the Washington Post, 26 June and 20 July 1960.)

Reports to the effect that Krim headed a pro-Chinese faction in the FLN against the "Europeans" such as Ferhat Abbas (see Washington Post articles cited above) were strengthened by the lavish praise accorded the Chinese by Krim in his public statements in Peiping. On 19 May, in his final banquet speech, he said "We have been dazzled by what we have seen. The achievements of the big leap forward are evident. Being limited in time...we have only seen a tiny part. Yet this suffices to serve as an example for us." The final communique signed by the Algerian delegation noted in good Chinese fashion that permanent peace could not be achieved until the colonialist exploiters

had been "wiped out" and that the attainment of world peace depended on the "determined struggle" of the people throughout the world against imperialism and colonialism. The communique also noted that the Algerian provisional government "greatly admires the economic and social achievements of the Chinese people in their socialist construction." The Chinese evidently could not get the FLN delegation to go so far as to condemn the United States, however. Whereas much of the communique noted that "both sides" agreed to several propositions, it was only the "Chinese Government," according to the communique, which "severely denounced and criticized French imperialism, aided by U.S. imperialism." It has long been one of the primary goals of the Chinese to link all the colonial and other problems of the world today to the American devil. That the FLN delegation stopped short of joining in such a condemnation of American policy was an indication that there were limits to its willingness to antagonize the United States.

The fact that the Soviet media broadcast only brief news coverage of the FLN visit to Peiping and offered no independent comment was an indication that the Russians were not overjoyed with the Chinese for having stolen a march on them in their campaign to pose as the defenders of the anti-colonialist world.

Growing Chinese Interest in Africa

The emergence of several newly independent African states in 1960 and the increasing importance of Africa in world politics came inevitably to have an impact on the Sino-Soviet dispute over strategy--much of which, as we have noted, revolved about the question of strategy in the underdeveloped world. Events in the spring of 1960 suggested that the Chinese were determined to assume a prominent, if not the leading, role in these areas, particularly in Africa. On 12 April, the anniversary of the Bandung Conference, there was formed in Peiping a China-African Friendship Association designed "to support the joint struggle of the African peoples in opposing imperialism and colonialism." Under a new spring schedule introduced by Peiping Radio's International Service on 14-15 April, the time devoted to broadcasts in English to Africa was doubled. The principal Chinese effort, however, was made at the second Afro-Asian

People's Solidarity Conference which met in Conakry, Guinea from 11-15 April.*

At that conference, for the first time at an African affair, the CPR overshadowed the USSR in terms of size and importance of its delegation, activity, and expenditures. The Chinese made a strong bid to dominate the proceedings and the organization itself. Evidently disturbed with the strong Egyptian influence in the organization, the Chinese were reported to have made unsuccessful attempts to remove the headquarters from Cairo and to bring it under Chinese, or at least Communist control.**

According to the Indian secretary on the permanent secretariat of the organization, the conference was marked by a clash between the Russian and Chinese representatives over the formulation of the economic resolution on the region's economic development. The draft resolution carried the following passage which the Chinese reportedly wanted deleted:

> Our task of achieving economic development will be completed sooner and better, the sooner the cold war is ended and international tension is reduced. The conference holds the firm view that relaxation of tension is the major condition for economic progress of Asian and African countries.

Chinese opposition to this portion of the draft, said the Indian secretary, "surprised everybody, and especially the Soviet delegate." The Chinese argument, he said, was that

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* For a fuller discussion of the conference, see Sino-Soviet Affairs, May, 1960, Department of State. The first "People's" Conference of this kind was held in Cairo in December 1957 and made emphatic claims to be regarded as the successor to the 1955 Bandung Conference. The Cairo Conference of 1957 assembled delegates from Africa and Asia. Aside from the delegates from the UAR and the Communist countries, none of the others were official. The conference, in short, was designed to aid both Nasser and the Communists to spread their respective influence in the Afro-Asian world among sections of the populace which both were trying to cultivate. The Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council, established in Cairo as a result, was largely financed by the Soviet Union, Communist China and Egypt.

** See "The Asian Analyst," June, 1960.

the above reference would "create illusions among Afro-Asian countries that imperialists want our economic development and seriously believe in disarmament and world peace." The Chinese persisted in their opposition to the passage, although it was pointed out at the conference that disarmament would enable Russia also to spare more funds for Afro-Asian economic development. The Chinese delegate was reported to have replied: "My country is not an imperialist country."

This example of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the question of economic investment in the underdeveloped countries is not an isolated example. As has already been noted, at precisely the same time an NCNA correspondent in Iraq was impertinently querying Mikoyan as to the difference between Soviet and Western imperialist plans for the economic development of the Afro-Asian countries. A month later, on 3 May, the Chinese delegate to the Afro-Asian Economic Conference in Cairo would flatly oppose a resolution setting up an Afro-Asian investment fund on the grounds that this would open the door to imperialist penetration.*

The reasons for Chinese hostility to large-scale Western or Soviet investment in the underdeveloped areas have already been suggested. The point to be made in this connection is that the Chinese were so vehement in their opposition to any such investment programs that they were willing to incur serious liabilities in their approaches to the very Afro-Asian countries which they were interested in wooing.

In sharp contrast, the Soviet delegation to the conference sought to project the USSR as a great military and economic power from whom the African nations could receive technical and financial assistance without strings.

* See "Asian Analyst," May 1960.

V. POSTSCRIPT: CHINA AND THE ABORTIVE SUMMIT

It is unlikely that Peiping was instrumental in the Soviet decision to wreck the summit conference in May. Although the Chinese had long argued that negotiations must not take priority over revolutionary struggle, Chinese public pronouncements on the eve of the summit seem to indicate a feeling of resignation rather than opposition. Mao himself was quoted on 14 May as having asserted that "the Chinese supported the holding of the summit conference, no matter whether this sort of conference made achievements or not, or whether the achievements were big or small." The language here could almost be interpreted as an attempt to remove pressure from Khrushchev by saying in effect that the Soviet leader did not necessarily have to gain concessions from the West in order to obtain Mao's post facto approval of the conference.

In the very next sentence, however, Mao revealed the essence of his attitude toward summitry: "But the winning of world peace must depend mainly on the resolute struggle carried out by people of all countries." In short, summitry was acceptable provided that negotiations did not gain priority over direct action tactics.

If the breakdown of the summit cannot therefore be attributed in significant measure to the Chinese, it nonetheless marked a significant turning point in the Sino-Soviet dispute. No sooner had Khrushchev packed his bags in Paris than the Chinese began an even more intensive campaign against Soviet strategic views. This Chinese campaign was soon to entail--at the WFTU meeting in Peiping in June 1960--a Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the Communist world that the Russians could no longer afford to minimize. The events at the WFTU conference will be discussed in a subsequent paper. It is important to note in this context only that it was the failure of the summit that evidently emboldened Mao to press to a new and critical stage his initiative against Khrushchev's strategy and tactics. Mao was emboldened probably because he believed that the abrupt failure of the summit would deal a severe blow to Khrushchev's prestige throughout the Communist world, particularly among those Stalinist elements in the Communist world who had all along shared Chinese dissatisfaction with the strategy of detente and coexistence.

The impending Chinese post-summit assault on Soviet strategy apparently did not come as any surprise to Moscow. Just three days after the summit collapse, the Soviet

theoretical journal Kommunist (no. 8, May 1960) went to press with an article on the failure of the summit which seemed to be more interested in refuting the Chinese than in attacking the Western "provocation" at Geneva. The article, an unsigned editorial, seemed to be intended as a preemptive move against anticipated Chinese calls for a fundamental revision of Soviet political strategy.

"Some have suggested," the editorial said, that

> in the interrelationships between two social systems there is another 'third way out'; neither war, nor peace, that is the maintenance and even strengthening of international tension... The 'third way out' is sheer mockery of the nations which thirst for a stable peace...

The article went on, clearly with the Chinese in mind, that "imperialist wars are inimicable to the forces of revolution," that revolutions can be brought about without war, that peaceful coexistence would not dull the vigilance of the people, and that economic power was the key to world revolution. It reiterated Khrushchev's significant statement in Paris on 16 May:

> The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that if not this government of the USA, then another, if not another, then a third, will understand that there is no alternative except peaceful coexistence of the two systems.

Finally, the article reiterated the Soviet confidence in its disarmament policy, contending--in direct contradiction to Peiping--that disarmament would free funds to assist the underdeveloped countries. It concluded, again in explicit contradiction to Peiping, that the USSR was not begging for peace but that its policy was motivated by strength.

This article, and others like it in the Soviet press shortly after the summit collapse, seemed intended to serve notice on the Communist world that the summit collapse did not presage a radical shift in Soviet foreign policy and world Communist strategy--a shift which in fact did not occur. The Russians were in effect saying that if Eisenhower did not wish to negotiate with them, they would wait for Kennedy or Nixon. If these results were unsatisfactory, they would wait still another four years. But, however much pressure on the West might be stepped up, they would not abandon the broad outlines at least of their coexistence strategy. This attitude clashed head-on with intensified Chinese urgings for a radical change in Soviet policy.